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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis tackles three seemingly disparate topics but all relate to quality of life issues and
public policy. The first issue relates to the interrelationship between economic growth and
income inequality. For example, some governments pursue pro-growth policies to promote
higher economic growth. At the same time, in countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and
the U.S., citizens express discontent regarding increasing income inequality. Inequality has
even become a major issue in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Multiple presidential can-
didates have included income inequality on their political platforms, addressing constituents’
demands for a policy package that achieves inclusive growth. The second issue is evident
in Southern Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, where real estate
prices increased substantially in recent years. The younger generation, in particular, has
demanded a special policy to curb unaffordable housing prices. Lastly, surveys reveal that
many people would like to buy locally-grown food to support the local economy. Govern-
ments have also endeavored to increase production of local food. However, it is unclear
whether or not increased food localization is economically viable.
These three public issues cover topics including economic growth and income distribu-
tion of a nation, the effectiveness of speculation-suppressing tax policies in housing markets,
and consumers’ attitudes toward local food relative to non-local counterparts. They are all
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closely integrated with citizens’ quality of life. This dissertation aims to explore these three
topics by adopting an appropriate empirical methodology for each topic, with methodolo-
gies that include macroeconomic and microeconomic techniques. In investigating the link
between inequality and economic growth, most past studies have pursued empirical analysis
using cross-sectional or pooled country-level data, which tends to ignore heterogeneity across
countries. These studies also tended to focus on only a unilateral relationship; that is, from
growth to inequality or from inequality to growth. We contribute to this literature by: 1)
conducting time-series analysis of individual countries to allow for country heterogeneity,
and 2) by examining the bilateral relationship between growth and inequality. To address
the effectiveness of price-curbing tax policy in Taiwan, we construct a two-tier regression
discontinuity model to provide robust estimates. As a result, we are able to isolate the effect
of the tax from the effect of other nontax factors, and also differentiate the impacts on the
short-run target real estate market between different tax rates imposed. Lastly, to explore
the conflicting outcomes among local food studies, we use a meta-synthetic approach with
a “5W1H” conceptual scaffold searching for attribute candidates which might explain the
range of results in the existing studies. The W’s represent Who, What, When, Where, and
Why, respectively, and the H stands for How. Below are the summaries of each chapter.
In Chapter 2, we build an inequality-growth-redistribution nexus, and apply the Engle-
Granger two-step ECM approach to estimate the long-run and short-run relationships be-
tween inequality and growth for four economies: China, Japan, South Korea, and the United
States. Our estimation results support the S-shaped curve hypothesis relating GDP per
capita to inequality with different starting points for the four economies. For the reverse
relationship, we find a positive causal relationship for China, Japan, and the United States,
indicating that increased income inequality spurred economic growth. In addition, we find
mixed results on the effect of trade openness on inequality and growth. Trade openness re-
duced inequality in the United States and Japan, worsened it in China and had no significant
effect in South Korea. In the inequality-GDP per capita relationship, exports provided an
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impetus to economic growth for Japan. As for redistribution, although fiscal redistributive
measures reduced inequality in Japan, they played no major role in the other three countries.
With regard to the inequality-GDP per capita relationship, all countries except for China
show a negative effect of fiscal redistribution on GDP per capita.
To limit excessive speculation on real estate and curb rising residential property prices in
Taiwan, the government imposed a special ad valorem tax (Specifically Selected Goods and
Services Tax; SSGST) on short-term transactions of real estate within the territory of Taiwan
starting in June 2011. In Chapter 3, we construct a two-tier regression discontinuity model to
examine the impacts of this speculation-curbing tax on the real estate market in Taiwan. We
find that the special ad valorem tax was effective in curbing increasing residential property
prices. However, the difference of tax rates imposed among the targeted and taxed housing
transactions was not statistically significant.
Over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in estimating the price
differential between locally-produced food and their non-local counterparts. Previous em-
pirical studies reveal conflicting results both in terms of the existence of price premiums
and their magnitude. Chapter 4 aims to identify possible key determinants of these diverse
findings. We conduct a standard meta-analysis of the empirical evidence on price premi-
ums or discounts of local food, based on a sample of 49 estimates obtained from 26 studies.
Our findings show that U.S. consumers tend to pay a higher premium for local food than
do European consumers. The variations in the estimated price premiums or discounts of
local food can also be explained by differences in the estimation methods and data used in
these studies. Studies using actual market prices generate a lower price premium of locally-
produced food than those using a willingness-to-pay value. This may imply that consumers
tend to overstate their value for locally-produced food in a hypothetical willingness-to-pay
situation. Among the types of local food, consumers’ attitudes toward meat are significantly
different from those toward milk and eggs. Furthermore, our results reflect that consumers
are increasingly interested in local food over time.
3
Chapter 2
Economic Growth and Income
Inequality in the Asia-Pacific Region:
A Comparative Study of China,
Japan, South Korea, and the United
States
*This chapter is co-authored with Professor Theresa Greaney.
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2.1 Introduction
Inequality has risen to the forefront of public debate in recent years as talk of the one
percent versus the ninety-nine percent has grown. Concerns over rising inequality motivated
the Occupy Wall Street movement and continue to motivate a backlash in many industrialized
countries towards international trade. The 2016 presidential campaign in the U.S. involves
lengthy political rhetoric over which candidate’s policies will better serve those at the bottom
of the income distribution. In Asia, China’s rapid increase in inequality has become a key
political issue that government leaders must address. Even in countries with relatively low
levels of inequality, such as Japan and South Korea, negative public sentiment over increases
in inequality has pushed the topic to the forefront. Economists and policy makers worry
that a persistently unbalanced sharing of the growth dividend will sour public support for
pro-growth policies and lead to political instability. Others worry that increased inequality
itself might undermine economic growth.
To address these concerns, economists are renewing their efforts to understand the rela-
tionship between economic development, growth and inequality. Many studies have tackled
this topic, but the results are varied and sometimes conflicting. Theoretically there are
structural and political pathways by which economic growth might affect income inequality,
and vice versa. Most past studies have pursued empirical analysis using cross-sectional or
pooled country-level data, which tends to ignore heterogeneity across countries. These stud-
ies also tended to focus on only a unilateral relationship; that is, from growth to inequality
or from inequality to growth. We propose contributing to this literature by: 1) conduct-
ing time-series analysis of individual countries to allow for country heterogeneity, and 2) by
examining the bilateral relationship between growth and inequality. Based on the inequality-
growth-redistribution nexus, we first build a baseline Error-Correction Model (ECM) with
common determinants suitable for all countries and then construct an ECM for each country
that includes country-specific determinants to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship
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between income inequality and economic growth. We also analyze the short-run impulse
responses of the variables. Our inquiry targets four Asia-Pacific region economies—China,
Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Our analysis finds support for the S-shaped curve hypothesis relating GDP per capita to
inequality with different starting points for our four economies. For the reverse relationship,
we find that increased inequality increases per capita GDP in the U.S., Japan and China,
but decreases it in South Korea. In addition, our results show mixed effects of trade open-
ness on inequality and growth. Trade openness reduced inequality in the U.S. and Japan,
worsened it in China and had no significant effect in South Korea. In the inequality-GDP
per capita relationship, exports provided an impetus to economic growth for Japan. As for
redistribution, although fiscal redistributive measures reduce inequality in Japan, they play
no major roles in the other three countries. Finally, all countries except for China show a
negative effect of fiscal redistribution on GDP per capita.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature on
the effect of economic growth on inequality and the effect of inequality on economic growth.
Section 3 discusses the analytical concept and transmission channels. Section 4 introduces
the dynamic causality analysis, including empirical modeling and data employed. Section
5 presents and compares the empirical results for China, Japan, South Korea and United
States, and the last section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Over the past 20 years, many studies have investigated the unidirectional or bidirectional
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. For each causal relationship,
however, theoretical predictions are controversial and empirical findings are mixed. This
section provides a brief overview of existing literature regarding the link between inequality
and economic growth.
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2.2.1 The Effect of Economic Growth on Inequality
A large portion of the literature on the effect of economic growth on inequality focuses on
the noteworthy “Kuznets’ (1955) inverted U curve”, which states that inequality increases
early in the industrialization process and then decreases with further development. In ad-
dition, some studies hypothesized a specific factor driving growth, e.g., globalization, while
investigating the effect of economic growth on inequality. After scrutinizing recent literature,
we found that the effect of economic growth on inequality varies; it could be positive (e.g.,
Rubin and Segal (2015); Wahiba and El Weriemmi (2014); Lundberg and Squire (2003)),
negative (e.g., Majumdar and Partridge (2009); Nissim (2007)) or mixed (e.g., Huang et al.
(2015); Chambers (2010)) due to different specifications of models, different datasets, and
different estimation methods. We highlight the main points as follows.
First of all, long-term effects may differ from short-term effects. By adopting the semi-
parametric method, Chambers (2010) found that economic growth increases income inequal-
ity for all countries over the short-run and medium-run. As for the long-term effect, economic
growth reduces inequality in developing countries but has the opposite effect in developed
countries.
Secondly, the impact of economic growth on income inequality is inconsistent as differ-
ent determinants are included in the model. For example, by taking trade openness and
human capital as determinants of inequality, Wahiba and El Weriemmi (2014) showed that
in Tunisia, economic growth is positively associated with inequality. Furthermore, trade
openness aggravated and human capital alleviated the degree of inequality. On the contrary,
taking growth volatility and human capital as determinants of inequality, Binatli (2012)
found that growth has a negative impact on income inequality. At the same time, he ver-
ified that higher volatility in growth might harm income inequality all the time, but the
magnitude of the effect of volatility in growth decreases over time.
In addition, worker mobility and the sensitivity of different income groups (i.e., high-
income versus low-income) to economic growth have been included as determinants of in-
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equality, which has produced diverse empirical results. Nissim (2007) demonstrated that
as economic growth occurs, workers mobilize to the jobs associated with higher incomes,
which helps to reduce income inequality. In other words, the impact of economic growth
through worker mobility on income inequality is negative. Rubin and Segal (2015) found
that in the U.S., during the post-war period (1953-2008), the high-income group was more
sensitive than the low-income group to wealth income and to performance-based compensa-
tion schemes (e.g. bonuses, stock and option grants). Furthermore, the high-income group
received more wealth income and performance-based compensation as the economy grew.
Based on the empirical results, they concluded that economic growth increases income in-
equality. It can be seen from the above that there is no clear answer to the effect of economic
growth on income inequality.
2.2.2 The Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth
Theoretically, some economists assert that the impact of income inequality on economic
growth is positive. In this view, larger inequality motivates low-income people to work
harder to earn more income and further increases economic growth. On the contrary, higher
inequality might reduce the opportunities for low-income people to access education and
thereby hinder economic growth. In this case, the impact of inequality on the economic
growth is negative. (Boushey and Price (2014))
The conflicting hypotheses provide the impetus for empirical studies. However, the em-
pirical studies also show conflicting results; some find a positive relationship (e.g., Li and
Zou (1998); Forbes (2000)), while others find a negative relationship (e.g.,Cingano (2014);
Wahiba and El Weriemmi (2014)).1 Additionally, some studies produce mixed evidence (e.g.,
Fawaz et al. (2014); Halter et al. (2014); Binatli (2012); Voitchovsky (2005); Barro (2000)),
while others find no relationship (e.g., Neves et al. (2012a)). This controversy could be due
to different econometric methodologies, different datasets and sample coverages, different
1There are other studies that also find a negative impact of inequality on economic growth, such as
Knowles (2005); Lundberg and Squire (2003); Castello´ and Dome´nech (2002); Chang and Ram (2000).
8
specifications of models, and\or different countries.
Although there are no consistent estimations empirically, the existing literature still pro-
vides important lessons. Firstly, the differentiation of long-term from short-term effects may
play an important role in estimating the impact of inequality on economic growth. For ex-
ample, Forbes (2000) showed that the impact of inequality on short-term economic growth is
positive. Halter et al. (2014), however, found that in the long-run, greater inequality causes
slower growth.
Secondly, some studies emphasize the importance of the level of development of a country.
Shin (2012) points out that theoretically, in the early stage of development, the impact of
inequality on economic growth is negative; however, it is positive in the mature stage of
development. Binatli (2012) supports this theoretical result by providing empirical evidence.
She separated her data into two periods, 1970-1985 and 1985-2012, and concluded that the
effect of inequality on economic growth is negative in the early period and positive in the
latter. Fawaz et al. (2014) also found that the impact of inequality on economic growth is
positive in high-income developing countries and negative in low-income developing countries.
Thirdly, the types of datasets adopted may drive different empirical results. According
to Cingano (2014) and Neves et al. (2012a), inequality has negative impacts on economic
growth in cross-sectional datasets and positive influences in panel datasets. Fourthly, the
specifications of models vary across the studies, particularly in terms of the usage of other
explanatory variables. Generally speaking, human capital, trade openness and investment
tend to increase growth, while the fertility rate decreases per capita growth, but these ad-
ditional determinants are not consistently used across studies. The studies provide evidence
that the link between inequality and economic growth is complex. To date, there is no
consistent answer to the causal relationship.
So far, most of the studies have tried to identify the determinants of economic growth
or income inequality independently. However, Lundberg and Squire (2003) emphasized that
economic growth and income inequality might share common determinants. Therefore, they
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evaluate the relationship between growth and inequality simultaneously. According to their
study, favorable exchange rates and trade improve economic growth but worsen income
inequality, while improved civil liberties improve equality but hurt growth.
Most studies that estimated bi-directional causality between economic growth and in-
come inequality used cross-sectional data or panel data. To our knowledge, among existing
literature, only Kang (2015) and Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008) examined bi-directional
causality between economic growth and income inequality by using time-series analysis.
However, Kang (2015) and Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008) included fiscal redistribution and
trade openness, respectively, in their estimations but ignored the effect of other possible
determinants. To fill this gap in the literature, our study employs time-series analysis in
order to capture the heterogeneity of individual countries and to examine the bi-directional
causality between economic growth and income inequality while including other explanatory
variables.
2.3 Analytical Concept and Transmission Channels
2.3.1 The Basic Scaffold
Figure 2.1: Inequality-Growth-
Redistribution Triangular Nexus
Based on the Developement
The well-known Kuznets’ “Inverted U Curve” tells us
that increased income inequality is inevitable in the early
stages of development, but the trend will be reversed with
further development. In investigating the evolution of
economic development and income inequality, Kuznets’
(1955) pioneering paper points out the involvement of
various factors such as social change, market restructur-
ing and government policies in determining the relation-
ship between them. Based on this perception, we build an inequality-growth-redistribution
triangular nexus with a core indicating their common connection with the level of economic
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development, as shown in Figure 2.1. With different development situations, inequality may
have positive or negative effects on economic growth, and vice versa.(See details in Section
3.2) In addition, high inequality of a country may provide a strong impetus for the gov-
ernment to redistribute income among different social classes. By using tax and transfer
mechanisms, the government may change the income distribution of a society, and further,
through inequality, extend the impact on economic growth. Furthermore, redistribution is
detrimental to economic growth as higher taxes and transfers hurt incentives to work and
invest. But redistribution may accelerate economic growth, provided that it involves reduc-
tion of tax loopholes or increases of productive government spendings. (Ostry et al. (2014);
Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagale´s (2011), Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagale´s (2013)) In other
words, under different conditions of development, the interactive relationships between these
variables could be varied and complicated.
The literature has tried to examine the causal explanations of growth and inequality, ei-
ther independently or simultaneously. Much of the early research into the causal relationship
assumed a monotonic relationship. However, Shin (2012) and Tribble (1999) demonstrate
that the relationship between the economic growth and the Gini coefficient must be non-
linear. In sum, there are two concerns underlying the research on income inequality and
economic growth. The first is the issue of bi-directional causality, and the second concern
involves non-linear relationships.
2.3.2 The Channels through which Economic Growth and Inequal-
ity Interact
2.3.2.1 The Channels through which Economic Growth Affects Inequaltiy
The channels through which economic growth affects income inequality involve various
complex factors in association with the evolution of economic growth. We classify these
channels into two categories. One is based on the types of responses to growth and the other
is concerned with the characteristics or sources of economic growth. Briefly speaking, the
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former indicates the institutional or structural changes caused by economic growth, which
directly lead to inequality. The latter comprises various economic or social/demographic
factors characterized by or synchronized with the growth process, which indirectly contribute
to inequality. According to the theoretical predictions, the signs of the effects of growth on
inequality are mixed.
Current theories in the first category reveal at least three channels that can explain
how growth affects the distribution of income. First, as described by the Kuznets curve,
throughout the development process, income inequality first increases and then decreases
due to the population shift from the agriculture to the manufacturing sector. The struc-
tural turning point is associated with the changes in intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral income
inequality. Tribble (1999) further captures the structural transition from manufacturing to
service during the economic development process. He regards the relationship depicting the
shift from manufacturing to service as an extension of the Kuznets’ inverted-U curve. These
two distinct transitions graphically combine and form a S-curve.
Secondly, capital income is concentrated at the upper-end of the income distribution and
it tends to be more sensitive than labor income to economic growth. Therefore, growth
benefits higher income groups disproportionately through large capital income gains. In
addition, the top income groups receive a large portion of their labor income in the form of
equity compensation, which further widens the income inequality.
Thirdly, economic growth has some beneficial effects for the poor such as new employment
opportunities. Slower growth puts strong downward pressure on wages and employment of
poor people. Workers are forced to accept wage cuts and work in the informal sector.
While the duality between regular and non-regular labor can keep unemployment low, non-
regular laborers typically earn less, which contributes to larger inequality. Therefore, stronger
economic growth can lower inequality by allowing more low-wage workers to shift from the
informal to the formal employment sector.
In addition, Zhuang et al. (2014) point out that globalization, technological change and
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market structuring are three key drivers of economic growth.2 One possible model to explain
the link between globalization and income inequality is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The
theory predicts that for developing countries with abundant unskilled labor, trade openness
should increase the demand for and wages of unskilled labor relative to the wages for skilled
labor and returns to capital, thereby decreasing income inequality. This result should be
reversed for developed countries with abundant skilled labor. Concerning the effects of
globalization through foreign direct investment (FDI), the basic theory suggests a similar
effect to that of trade in the Stolper-Samuelson model. However, as Heshmati and Lee (2010)
indicate, there are several other trade/FDI theories proposed recently to explain the effect
of globalization on income distribution. The mechanisms they mention differ from country
to country and the results of predictions are mixed.3
Secondly, technology changes can affect the distribution of income among different factors
of production. The introduction of new technology, which usually accelerates growth, may
benefit relatively richer segments of the population, and worsen income inequality. If the
technological change benefits skilled labor more than unskilled labor, the skill premium will
go up, which might increase inequality. If the technology is capital-biased, it also could
increase the income inequality because capital incomes usually accrue to the rich more than
to the poor.
Finally, the market structures associated with economic growth, either for products or
for factors, can also have significant distributional consequences. In general, transition from
a command to a market economy can increase efficiency and benefit more the factors with
relative scarcity, thus changing the income distribution. Labor unionization can change the
bargaining power of labor in relation to capital owners and, accordingly, the income shares
between labor and capital. Furthermore, a fairer and more competitive market can ensure
that the benefits of growth accrue to more market participants instead of a small number of
2See also C¸elik and Basdas (2010), Krongkaew and Kakwani (2003), Dahlby and Ferede (2013), and
Chang and Ram (2000).
3See also Dreher and Gaston (2008), Ines Sim David (2011), and C¸elik and Basdas (2010).
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business people and entrepreneurs.
In sum, these three key drivers of growth– globalization, technological change, and market
restructuring– all impact income inequality through changing the relative shares of income
between skilled and unskilled labor, and between labor and capital. However, the effects of
these three drivers are closely interwined and not easy to isolate empirically. (Zhuang et al.
(2014))
2.3.2.2 The Channels through which Inequality Affects Economic Growth
The channels through which income inequality affects economic growth are discussed
throughout the literature on economic growth. Inequality affects economic growth through
mechanisms that can be beneficial or detrimental. Moreover, some of these effects tend
to be realized quickly while others are incurred slowly over time. These channels can be
grouped into two divergent approaches. One is based on purely economic mechanisms and
the other is associated with political processes. These various mechanisms indicate that
the impact of inequality on growth is rather complex and ambiguous. Generally speaking,
according to Halter et al. (2014), the purely economic mechanisms usually manifest the
growth-enhancing (or positive) effects of inequality while the political processes are the
negative channels through which inequality hinders growth. However, there is still debate
regarding these channels and their combined effects.
Among the theoretical economic channels, one of the most popular arguments for growth-
enhancing inequality is based on the standard hypothesis that individual savings rates rise
with the level of income. As more income becomes concentrated at the top, the aggregate
savings rate tends to increase, which leads to higher investment rates. A rise in inequality
hence tends to positively affect economic growth through capital accumulation.
Secondly, some types of investments, especially those in innovative activities, may require
a large minimum amount of money. Innovators often depend on high-income investors to
provide the initial capital. An economy with more unequal distribution of income may find
it easier to fund innovative projects, which lead to a faster rate of economic growth.
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Thirdly, with more concentrated distribution of income and wealth, there might be a
positive demand-side effect. The demand for more innovative or novel products will increase
as opposed to demand for goods satisfying basic needs. This will induce the investments
required to develop novel or better product varieties.
However, in a model of credit market imperfection, individuals and families with low
incomes often cannot make productivity-enhancing investments in education and training for
themselves. The banking sector constraints that limit the ability of the non-rich to borrow
give rise to so-called capital market imperfection. Redistribution of assets and incomes from
rich to poor tends to raise the productivity of investment and boost the rate of economic
growth.
In addition to economic mechanisms, political processes also cause negative effects on
economic growth. For example, income inequality might motivate the poor to engage in
crime, riots, and other disruptive activities, which may threaten political stability and un-
dermine the security of property rights. These social unrest phenomena are not friendly for
investment. Lower economic growth will thus go along with worsening inequality.
Furthermore, Yusuf et al. (2005) point out that in a system of majority voting, the pres-
sure to redistribute income from the rich to the poor is greater when the ratio of the average
income to the medium income in the society is larger. Measures to redistribute income
through higher taxes can give rise to economic disincentives to work, save and investment
and hence lower economic growth.
However, if inequality creates more pressure on the government to finance public educa-
tion, which largely benefits the lower income people, economic growth will increase through
higher human capital accumulation. In other words, the impact of redistribution on growth
depends on what form the government’s spending takes and what taxes are used to finance
it.
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2.4 The Dynamic Causality Analysis
2.4.1 Empirical Modeling
Considering the inherent deficiency of ignoring distinctive country-specific features by
cross-sectional analysis, we choose to employ country-level time-series analysis. By this
method, as Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008) indicate, we can allow country heterogeneity in
analyzing the relationship between economic growth and inequality.4 Thus, for exploring the
dynamic relationship between output level and income inequality, we use an error-correction
model (ECM). Following Engle and Granger’s two-step approach, we first test for a coin-
tegrating relationship between output level and inequality. In addition, we also take into
account other factors. By using augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, each time-series variable
is examined in isolation for its non-stationarity, i.e., integration of order 1 or I(1).5 Then, af-
ter estimating the cointegrating regression, the regression residuals were retrieved and tested
for stationarity, i.e., integration of order 0 or I(0). If the residual term is stationary, then
the time-series variables are cointegrated and the long-run relationship among variables can
be established.
As with most previous literature on this topic, we use GDP per capita to measure av-
erage income level and the Gini coefficient to measure income inequality. The link between
average income level and income inequality is discussed bilaterally. In addition to regressing
the GDP per capita on the Gini coefficient, we also estimate a cointegrating regression of the
Gini coefficient on the GDP per capita.6 In our time-series study, we model income inequal-
ity in the long run as a function of the average income level and other determinants as follows:
4See also Kang (2015) and Huang et al. (2015).
5The test results for unit roots are available upon request.
6This is consistent with the assumption that all variables in the cointegrating regression are jointly
endogenous employed by the Engle-Granger two-step approach.(Best (2008))
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Ginit = α0 + α1 (ln GDP per capitat) + α2 (ln GDP per capitat)
2
+ α3 (ln GDP per capitat)
3 +
n∑
i=1
φiXi,t + t
(2.1)
where Ginit is the measurement of income inequality, ln GDP per capitat is the real per
capita gross domestic product expressed in nautral logarithm form, (ln GDP per capitat)
2
and (ln GDP per capitat)
3 are its square and cubic forms, respectively, Xit indicates all other
explanatory variables, and t is the regression residual. Similarly, we adopt the following
formulation to estimate the effect of income inequality and other determinants on output
level in the long run:
lnGDP per capita t = β0 + β1Ginit +
n∑
i=1
µiZi,t + ut (2.2)
where Zit are all explanatory variables but Ginit for determining the effect on lnGDP per
capitat, and ut is the regression residual.
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The determinants we employ in equations (1) or (2), other than Gini and lnGDP per
capita which are the major concern of our study, are suggested by economic theory and
previous studies. In the growth-inequality relationship, we look into the effects of trade
openness and government redistributive policies. As for the inequality-growth relationship,
based on both macroeconomic theory and the endogenous growth model, we put emphasis
on factors such as exports, private investment and government expenditures, which may
stimulate the level of output, and human and physical capitals, which can affect the economic
growth rate.8
7There are few studies, such as Shin (2012), which model the inequality-economic growth relationship in
non-linear(square) form. After running the equations for each country, we decided to drop out the square
term in the formulation due to its statistical insignificance.
8We considered including the aged population share as a determinant of explaining the inequality-
economic growth relationship, but it did not conform to the necessary condition of being I(1). As for
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In order to compare the relationships between growth and inequality among countries,
we first build a baseline model which comprises the common determinants and covers data
with similar time periods. By this way, we can investigate and differentiate the effects on
growth or inequality under the same model projection for each individual country. After
running various combinations of potential explanatory variables, only one variable, Trade,
fits the requirements of cointegrating regression and is selected for Xit. As for Zit, there are
four variables, Labor force, Export, Govt. con., and Investment, included in the regression.
Secondly, we selectively apply different variables for different countries in estimating the
cointegrating regressions. In this way, we allow for country heterogeneity by only includ-
ing determinants that produce statistically significant coefficients in equations (1) and (2)
for each individual country. Thus, for both the U.S and China9, we include Trade; for
Japan, we use Redistribution, Redistribution ∗ Ginimkt, and Trade; and for South Ko-
rea, we employ no additional variables in Xit. Similarly, for Zit, we include Laborforce,
Govt con., and Redistribution in the U.S. case; we use Laborforce, Export, Govt con.,
Investment, Fertility rate, and Redistribution in Japan’s case; we employ Primary,
Govt con., Fertility rate, and Redistribution in South Korea’s case; and we add Investment
and Labor force in China’s case. These added variables are defined in Table 2.1. After the
estimation of equations (1) and (2), if t and ut are tested as stationary then all time-series
variables are cointegrated, and the estimated coefficients of each variable reflect their long-
run effects.
According to the Engle-Granger two-step error correction model, equations (1) and (2)
portray the long-run relationship among output level, income inequality and their determi-
nants. In the second step, we try to capture the short-run effect of each variable on inequality
and output level, respectively. By regressing the changes in Gini on lagged changes in its
determinants as well as the equilibrium residual represented by t−1, we can derive the short-
the economic growth-inequality relationship, foreign direct investment (FDI) was considered as one of the
explanatory variables, but was dropped due to data insufficiency.
9For China, due to the insufficient and discontinuous time-series data, only post-1978 data have been
used in the regression.
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Table 2.1: Definitions of Variables
Variables Definition Source
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) WDI
Gini net
Gini index of inequality in equivalized household
SWIID
disposable (post-tax and post-transfer) income
Gini mkt
Gini index of inequality in equivalized household
SWIID
(pre-tax and pre-transfer) income
Redistribution The difference between Gini mkt and Gini net SWIID
Export Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI
Trade Export plus import (% of GDP) WDI
Gov. con.
General government final consumption
WDI
expenditure (% of GDP)
Investment Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) WDI
Fertility rate Fertility rate, total (births per woman) WDI
Labor force Population ages 15-64 (% of total) WDI
Primary School enrollment, primary (% of gross) WDI
term effects of explanatory variables in the prior period on Gini in the current period.10 In
addition, we also can capture the rate at which Gini adjusts to the equilibrium state after a
shock, which is called the adjustment speed of error correction. A similar equation is used
to capture the short-term effects of each variable on GDP per capita. The respective error
correction models to equations (1) and (2) are shown as follows:
∆Ginit = θ0 + θ1 (∆ lnGDP per capitat−1) + θ2 (∆ lnGDP per capitat−1)
2
+ θ3 (∆ lnGDP per capitat−1)
3 +
n∑
i=1
δi∆Xi,t−1 + θ4t−1 + νt
(2.3)
∆ ln GDP per capitat = γ0 + γ1∆Ginit−1 +
n∑
i=1
λi∆Zi,t−1 + γ2ut−1 + pit (2.4)
where ∆ indicates the change of variables, νt and pit are the residuals. Among the coefficients,
θ4 and γ2 are the adjustment rates of speed and are expected to be negative and significant.
In addition, the Durbin-Watson test is used to check if the serial correlation problem exists
10Due to the limited sample size, we chose a maximum lag length of two for the variables. However, in
the study the variables with second order of lag are less efficient than that with first order of lag by using
AIC test. Thus, the lag length set at one is selected for variables in equations (3) and (4).
19
and the Prais-Winsten correction is applied if necessary.
In the study, we employ this time-series analysis for each country in order to better under-
stand how economies experience different dynamics between growth and income inequality
in their unique development context. Also, by incorporating long and short term effects into
the model, we formulate the relationship between output level and inequality in equilibrium
and the link between growth and inequality in a dynamic sense. The usual Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation applies to all equations.11
2.4.2 Data Employed
The dataset this analysis used is mainly from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database 5.0 (SWIID) and World Development Indicators (WDI). For the measurement
of income inequality, the Gini coefficient is generated from the mean of 100 imputations
in SWIID. There are two kinds of Gini coefficients adopted in this analysis. One is the
Gini net coefficient, which stands for the Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root
scale) household disposable income post-taxes and transfers; the other one is the Gini market
coefficient, which is the Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household
income pre-taxes and transfers. For the measurement of economic development, the real
GDP per capita is extracted from the WDI. All of the other explanatory variables come
from the WDI. The variables used in the regression are listed and explained in Table 2.1.
The targeted yearly time series dataset for each country covers the period from 1960
to 2014, but SWIID does not have complete country time series. For the U.S., the sample
coverage is from 1960 to 2012; for Japan, from 1960 to 2010; for South Korea, from 1963
to 2013; and for China, the sample covers the years 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974,
and 1975, and then annually from 1978 to 2013. In addition, in South Korea’s time-series
dataset, primary school enrollment rate only covers the period from 1971 to 2014.
11In this study, for simplicity, we treat each equation between growth and inequality independently, similar
to other studies such as Binatli (2012). For details about the estimation problems, see Lundberg and Squire
(2003).
20
2.5 The Empirical Results
2.5.1 Comparative Evidence on the Effect of Economic Growth
on Inequality
2.5.1.1 The Results for the Baseline Models
For the convenience of comparison, the estimated results of the baseline models for all
four countries are summarized in Table 2.2. In the long run relationship regression, all
variables are cointegrated for each individual country. Among the common determinants,
the three GDP per capita terms are all statistically significant in the cointegrating equation
for each country case. However, the signs of the coefficients are negative, positive, and
negative for the U.S. and China; and positive, negative, and positive for Japan and South
Korea. This indicates that the relationships between GDP per capita and income inequality
for each individual country all conform to the S-shape curve hypothesis. However, the slopes
at the starting portion of the curve differ across countries over the similar sample period.
In addition, the coefficients on trade openness are statistically significant for the U.S. and
China. This implies that globalization has impacted income inequality, but for the U.S., the
link is negative, and for China, it is positive. Trade openness, however, has no significant
effect on income inequality for Japan and South Korea.
As for the short run effect estimated in the ECM regression, the adjustment speed coef-
ficients are all negative and statistically significant for each of the four countries. In terms
of the change of the explanatory variables, they all have insignificant effects on the changes
of income inequality in the cases of the U.S., South Korea, and China. However, for Japan,
the coefficients on the growth of GDP per capita in all three forms have significant effects on
the changes of income inequality and the signs are negative, positive, and negative in order.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Economic Growth on Inequality: Baseline Model
The Effect of Economic Growth on Inequality: Baseline Model
USA CR JPN CR KOR CR CHN CR
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Gini
ln GDP per capita -69.510*** 25.226*** 3.504** -2.635***
(13.567) (6.987) (1.382) (0.367)
(ln GDP per capita)2 6.622*** -2.648*** -0.390** 0.397***
(1.329) (0.717) (0.161) (0.059)
(ln GDP per capita)3 -0.210*** 0.093*** 0.014** -0.019***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.006) (0.003)
Trade -0.002*** -0.0002 0.0001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Constant 242.995*** -79.719*** -10.090** 5.933***
(46.139) (22.644) (3.916) (0.753)
N 53 51 51 43
r2 0.917 0.681 0.616 0.973
r2 a 0.911 0.653 0.583 0.970
rmse 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.016
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
USA ECM JPN ECM KOR ECM CHN ECM
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
D. Gini
D.ln GDP per capitat−1 2.044 -23.369* 4.176 -2.750
(29.205) (12.95) (2.902) (2.497)
D.(ln GDP per capita)2t−1 -0.236 2.378* -0.470 0.417
(2.861) (1.344) (0.342) (0.381)
D.(ln GDP per capita)3t−1 0.009 -0.081* 0.018 -0.021
(0.093) (0.046) (0.013) (0.019)
D.Tradet−1 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Error correctiont−1 -0.328*** -0.381*** -0.551*** -0.343**
(0.111) (0.102) (0.120) (0.145)
Constant 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
N 51 49 50 36
r2 0.214 0.290 0.467 0.185
r2 a 0.127 0.207 0.406 0.045
rmse 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
DW 2.22 2.00 2.06 1.64
1. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
2.Numbers in parentheses are the standard error.
3.The sample period for the U.S. is 1960-2012; for Japan is 1960-2010; for South Korea is
1963-2013; and for China is 1964-2013.
2.5.1.2 Results for Country-Specific Models12
In Table 2.3, we summarize the estimation results for the country-specific models best
applied to each individual country. For the U.S., the three GDP per capita coefficients are
all significant at the 1% level in the cointegrating regression. The first term is negative,
12For the results of country-specific models, we run different regressions in various combination of variables
and selectively apply the most suitable one to each specific country. All required tests necessary to the
Engle-Granger two-step model, including cointegration and adjustment responses, have been undertaken
and ensured.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Economic Growth on Inequality: Country-Specific Model
The Effect of Economic Growth on Inequality: Country-Specific Model
USA CR JPN CR KOR CR CHN CR
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Gini
ln GDP per capita -69.510*** 11.755* 4.020** -3.151***
(13.567) (6.297) (0.773) (0.766)
(ln GDP per capita)2 6.622*** -1.228* -0.450*** 0.474***
(1.329) (0.653) (0.090) (0.116)
(ln GDP per capita)3 -0.210*** 0.043* 0.017*** -0.023***
(0.043) (0.023) (0.003) (0.006)
Trade -0.002*** -0.001*** - 0.001*
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Redistribution - -2.360*** - -
(0.230)
Redis ∗Gini mkt - 5.056*** - -
(0.575)
Constant 242.995*** -37.112* -11.553*** 7.063***
(46.139) (20.222) (2.194) (1.671)
N 53 51 51 36
r2 0.917 0.889 0.615 0.973
r2 a 0.911 0.873 0.59 0.970
rmse 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.017
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
USA ECM JPN ECM KOR ECM CHN ECM
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
D. Gini
D.ln GDP per capitat−1 2.044 -16.975 3.709 -2.933
(29.205) (15.885) (2.755) (2.499)
D.ln GDP per capita2t−1 -0.236 1.716 -0.416 0.444
(2.861) (1.647) (0.325) (0.381)
D.ln GDP per capita3t−1 0.009 -0.058 0.016 -0.022
(0.093) (0.057) (0.013) (0.019)
D.Tradet−1 -0.0002 -0.0002 - -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003)
D.Redistributiont−1 - 1.729*** - -
(0.319)
D.Redis ∗Gini mktt−1 - -3.733*** - -
(0.793)
Error Correctiont−1 -0.328* -0.565** -0.549*** -0.342**
(0.111) (0.222) (0.116) (0.145)
Constant 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
N 51 49 50 35
r2 0.214 0.508 0.470 0.186
r2 a 0.127 0.424 0.423 0.045
rmse 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.010
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
DW 2.22 1.944 2.06 1.66
1. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
2. Numbers in parentheses are the standard error.
3. The sample period for the U.S. is 1960-2012; for Japan is 1960-2010; for South Korea is 1963-2013;
for China is 1978-2013.
the second term is positive and the third term is negative which is consistent with the S-
curve hypothesis. However, it starts with the back portion of inverted U-shaped Kuznets
curve. There are two turning points associated with specific structural shift in the economic
development process. In addition, the coefficient of trade openness is negative and significant.
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This result implies that greater trade openness tends to lower inequality in the long run. As
for the short-run effect estimated in the ECM regresssion, the growth in GDP per capita
has a negative effect on inequality in the second term and positive effects for both the first
and third terms. However, the coefficient values are all statistically insignificant and smaller
than their long-run counterparts. This indicates that the change of GDP per capita has no
significant effect on the change of income inequality. Also the changes in trade openness
have no significant effects on the Gini during the dynamic process.
For Japan, in addition to the real GDP per capita terms, we include three other explana-
tory variables after trying various combinations. Among them, Redistribution∗Gini mkt is
an interaction term to capture if the effect of government redistributive measures on income
inequality might depend on the level of income inequality before the government intervention.
In the long-run equilibrium, the three GDP per capita terms are all statistically significant
and the signs of the coefficients are positive, negative, and positive, respectively. This result is
consistent with the Kuznets’ inverted-U curve hypothesis and it also conforms to the S-curve
hypothesis. For other factors, Redistribution has a negative effect on income inequality as
expected. On the other hand, the interaction term of Redis∗Gini mkt has a positive effect,
which indicates that the redistributive effect of government taxes and transfers depends on
the level of income inequality prior to government interventions. The negative effect of gov-
ernment policy on income inequality was noticeably offset by the original status of income
distribution. In addition, trade openness helps to reduce income inequality for Japan. For
the short-run results, only the changes of redistributive measures have significant effects on
the change of income inequality.
The specification of the cointegrating regression for South Korea is different from those
used in the two cases above. We only employ the three terms of GDP per capita as explana-
tory determinants in the model. The long-run effects of the three GDP per capita terms on
income inequality are all statistically significant at the 5% level. The sign of the first term is
positive, second term is negative, and third term is positive. This is similar to the results we
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obtained in Japan’s case and consistent with the S-shaped curve hypothesis starting from
the front portion of the Kuznets’ inverse U-shaped curve. For the short-run responses, we
find that changes in the explanatory variables have no significant effects on changes in the
Gini in a dynamic sense. Although insignificant, the signs of the changes in the three GDP
per capita terms are the same as in the long-run regression.
Due to the data insufficiency and discontinuity problem, we decide to employ post-1978
data for China to better fit the econometric estimations requirements. After trials of inclusion
of the different explanatory variables in various combinations, we chose to include trade
openness, in addition to the three GDP per capita terms, as determinants of inequality in
the regression. For the long-run coefficients, we find that the signs of the coefficients of the
three terms associated with GDP per capita are negative, positive, and negative, respectively.
This implies that China’s time series variables follow the S-curve hypothesis starting from
the back portion of the inverted U-curve. For China, the trade variable is a significant and
positive determinant of inequality, which differs from the result for the U.S. As for short-run
dynamic effects, all determinants, except the error correction term, in change form have no
significant effect on income inequality.
2.5.2 Comparative Evidence on the Effect of Inequality on Eco-
nomic Growth
2.5.2.1 The Results for the Baseline Models
The estimated results of the baseline models for each individual country are presented
in Table 2.4. For the long run equilibrium relationship, all countries but South Korea
conform with the conditions required to use cointegrating regression. After running various
combinations of explanatory variables, no cointegrating relationship can be found in the
regression. Hence, we take the first difference of all variables to run the regression for South
Korea.
In the long run equilibrium, higher income inequality increased economic growth for
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth: Baseline Model
The Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth: Baseline Model
USA CR JPN CR CHN CR KOR FD
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
ln GDP per capita
Gini 5.286*** 2.823** 2.434*** -0.143
(0.570) (1.052) (0.614) (0.306)
Labor force 0.097*** 0.192*** 0.106*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Export 0.011 0.040*** -0.002 -0.002*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.001)
Govt con. 0.032* 0.169*** 0.007 -0.028***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.004)
Investment 0.007 0.011 0.029*** 0.006***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.002)
Constant 1.429* -6.995*** -2.519*** 0.046***
(0.729) (1.105) (0.570) (0.001)
N 53 51 43 50
r2 0.966 0.941 0.986 0.664
r2 a 0.963 0.934 0.984 0.626
rmse 0.062 0.122 0.133 0.022
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
DW 1.90
USA ECM JPN ECM CHN ECM
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
D. ln GDP per capita
D.Ginit−1 -0.439 -0.047 0.264
(0.747) (0.382) (0.362)
D.Labor forcet−1 0.008 0.053*** -0.019
(0.019) (0.011) (0.026)
D.Exportt−1 -0.013*** -0.007** 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
D.Govt con.t−1 -0.006 -0.013 0.010**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
D.Investmentt−1 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Error correctiont−1 -0.109* -0.132*** -0.119*
(0.061) (0.037) (0.070)
Constant 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.022)
N 52 50 36
r2 0.240 0.583 0.254
r2 a 0.138 0.524 0.100
rmse 0.018 0.024 0.021
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0)
DW 1.96 1.95 1.51
1. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
2.Numbers in parentheses are the standard error.
3.KOR FD indicates that the first-differences of the variables are taken as we run the
long run regression for South Korea.
4.The sample period for the U.S. is 1960-2012; for Japan is 1960-2010; for South Korea is
1963-2013; and for China is 1964-2013.
the U.S., Japan and China. The Labor force variable shows positive effects on the GDP
per capita for all four countries. For the Export variable, the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant only in two countries, with a positive effect for Japan and negative
for South Korea. Government expenditures are found to have significant and positive growth
effects in the U.S. and Japan but a negative effect in South Korea. Finally, the Investment
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variable produces positive coefficients for all four countries as expected, but the coefficients
for the U.S. and Japan are not statistically significant.
In the short run, the dynamic adjustment coefficients of ECM models are all negative
and statistically significant. We find that none of the lagged changes of Gini have a statistic
significant effect on changes in the GDP per capita. In the U.S. and Japan, the lagged change
of Export has a significant and negative effect on the change of GDP per capita. Growth
in the Labor force positively impacts GDP per capita growth in Japan, while growth in
government expenditure has a positive impact in China. Finally, the short run effects of
investment growth are all positive but insignificant for the U.S., Japan, and China.
2.5.2.2 Results for Country-Specific Models13
We summarize the estimated results of the country-specific models for each country in
Table 2.5. The explanatory variables we employ to explain the U.S. real GDP per capita are
Gini, Laborforce, Govt consumption, and Redistribution. The Gini has a positive effect
on GDP per capita at the 1% significance level. This suggests that income inequality has
been beneficial to economic development from the experience of the U.S. In addition, the
labor force variable and government expenditure have positive effects on per capita output,
as expected. However, fiscal redistribution policies reduce per capita output. With respect
to the short-run responses, we estimate a negative effect of the change in Gini on GDP per
capita growth but it is not statistically significant. Among other determinants, no lagged
changes of explanatory variables have significant measured effects on economic growth.
For Japan, Gini, Labor force, Export, Govt con., Investment, Fertility, and Redistri−
bution are included as potential determinants of the GDP per capita. Similar to the U.S.
results, we find a positive long-run relationship between income inequality and GDP per
capita for Japan. In other words, the economy achieved a higher income level, but at a
cost of increased inequality. The effects of the other variables on real GDP per capita are
all found to be statistically significant. Among them, labor force, export ratio, government
13Please refer to footnote 12.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth: Country-Specific Model
The Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth: Country-Specific Model
USA CR JPN CR KOR CR CHN CR
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
ln GDP per capita
Gini 5.473*** 4.093*** -22.755*** 3.094***
(0.383) (1.178) (3.568) (0.866)
Labor force 0.115*** 0.169*** - 0.103***
(0.006) (0.017) (0.014)
Export - 0.039*** - -
(0.011)
Govt con. 0.022** 0.168*** 0.124*** -
(0.01) (0.022) (0.024)
Investment - 0.023* - 0.018*
(0.013) (0.009)
Primary - - 0.066** -
(0.026)
Fertility - -0.290* -0.331*** -
(0.158) (0.062)
Redistrbution -2.933** -2.070** -16.694** -
(1.151) (0.852) (7.241)
Constant 0.958** -5.366*** 9.260*** -2.113***
(0.404) (1.382) (2.351) (0.700)
N 53 51 42 36
r2 0.970 0.950 0.95 0.980
r2 a 0.967 0.942 0.943 0.978
rmse 0.058 0.114 0.179 0.133
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
USA ECM JPN ECM KOR ECM CHN ECM
Dependent Variable:
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
D. ln GDP per capita
D.Ginit−1 -0.570 -0.309 0.064 0.133
(0.856) (0.436) (0.877) (0.338)
D.Labor forcet−1 0.002 0.055*** - -0.010
(0.023) (0.012) (0.018)
D.Exportt−1 - -0.006* - -
(0.003)
D.Govt con.t−1 -0.002 -0.011 0.004 -
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
D.Investmentt−1 - -0.002 - 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
D.Primaryt−1 - - 0.004 -
(0.007)
D.Fertilityt−1 - 0.049 -0.100** -
(0.033) (0.039)
D.Redistributiont−1 0.207 0.003 2.649** -
(0.653) (0.290) (1.035)
Error correctiont−1 -0.160** -0.144*** -0.093** -0.087*
(0.077) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051)
Constant 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.086***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011)
N 52 50 40 35
r2 0.106 0.560 0.446 0.229
r2 a 0.009 0.474 0.345 0.126
rmse 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.020
Res. ADF test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
DW 1.90 1.93 1.881 1.66
1. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
2. Numbers in parentheses are the standard error.
3. The sample period for the U.S. is 1960-2012; for Japan is 1960-2010; for South Korea is
1971-2013; for China is 1978-2013.
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expenditures, and investment have positive effects on real per capita output. However, the
fertility rate and fiscal redistributive policies have negative effects. As for the dynamic
responses to the changes of the determinants, the results obtained indicate that changes
in income inequality affect output growth negatively but with an insignificant coefficient.
Labor force changes have a positive and significant effect on economic growth while export
ratio changes have a negative and significant effect. The other variables did not produce
significant coefficients.
We include income inequality, primary school enrollment rate, government expenditure,
fertility rate, and fiscal redistribution in the regression for South Korea. As a long-run
equilibrium relationship, there is an indication that the Gini coefficient has a negative and
significant effect on real GDP per capita. This implies that increased income inequality
has hindered economic development in South Korea. In the long-run the primary school
enrollment rate and government expenditures are both found to be beneficial for increasing
real GDP per capita. This confirms our expectations based on the basic GDP model. On the
other hand, fertility rate and redistribution have negative effects on per capita output, which
is similar to the results found in Japan’s case. As for the short-run responses, the change
of income inequality has a positive but insignificant effect on output growth. Among other
determinants, only the changes of fertility rate and redistribution are statistically significant
determinants of output growth in the short-run dynamics.
We use only post-1978 data to run the regression for China as mentioned previously. We
chose Gini, Investment, and Labor force as significant determinants of GDP per capita
in the regression for China. For the long-run equilibrium relationship, we find that income
inequality is beneficial to economic output. In addition, real investment and labor force
are both statistically significant and positive in relation to GDP per capita. From the
results estimated by the ECM equation, changes in income inequality have a positive but
insignificant effect on GDP per capita growth. Also, the effects of other determinants on
GDP per capita growth are all statistically insignificant.
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2.5.3 Brief Analytical Comparisons and Discussions
2.5.3.1 Analytical Comparisons
Using beta weights,14 we can compare the contribution of each variable to growth and
inequality within each country or across countries. We find that the GDP per capita is
the most important determinant of income inequality for all four countries. In the income
inequality-growth relationship, the labor force is the most important variable, followed by
the Gini coefficient, for the U.S. and China. The government expenditure accounts for the
largest variance in the regression for Japan. In contrast, for South Korea, the Gini coefficient
plays the most important role.
According to the S-curve hypothesis, the sectoral shift of population in the economic
development process plays a major role in explaining changes in income inequality. There
are two critical turning points inherent in the process. The former one involves the struc-
tural transition from agriculture to manufacturing (i.e., industrialization) and the later one
captures the structural transition from manufacturing to services (i.e. deindustrialization).
Both share a similar logic in explaining changes in income inequality prior to or after the
turning points. In each structural transition, we find that the level of intrasectoral income
inequality in the modern sector exceeds the corresponding level in the traditional sector.
At the same time, the growth of GDP per capita in the modern sector exceeds the growth
level in the traditional sector. This implies an increase in intersectoral income inequality
during the development process. Both of these changes in intrasectoral and intersectoral
inequality cause the aggregate income inequality to accelerate. Only after the surplus labor
in the traditional sector is totally absorbed by the modern sector will the aggregate income
inequality reverse course and begin to decline.
Our study provides further evidence supporting the S-shaped curve hypothesis linking
income inequality and economic development for our four countries. However, the countries
14We cannot do the variance decomposition analysis due to the use of Engle-Granger two-step approach
in our study. Hence, to assess the variable importance in the regression, we employ the beta weights.
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vary in their positions along the S-curve over the study period. Japan and South Korea
started on the upward-sloping portion, while the U.S. and China started on the downward-
sloping portion.
Generally speaking, among the four countries in our study and the starting point of
1960, the U.S. is the most advanced economy, followed by Japan, and then South Korea,
and then China. The S-curve relationship between output level and inequality for each
individual country is projected and showed in Figure 2.2. It is noted that the U.S. reached
the highest level of GDP per capita, followed closely by Japan and South Korea, while China
was far behind during the study period. However, China experienced the largest and most
rapid increase in inequality. By comparison, Japan maintained the lowest inequality while
achieving strong income growth over the study period.
Figure 2.2: The Projected Re-
lationship between Output Level
and Inequality
The shape of the curve in the relationship between
output level and inequality depends on two factors for
each individual country: (1) the length of the sample pe-
riod selected, and (2) the structural transition undergone
during the time period. In this study, the data period
covered for the U.S. is 1960-2012. As implied by Figure
2.3, the structural transition from agriculture to manu-
facturing for the U.S. happened far earlier than our figure
shows using data from 1947 onward. If we had included
data spanning the U.S. industrialization period, we ex-
pect we would have found evidence of Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped curve, as found in Tribble
(1999), and we could connect this with the deindustrialization period U-shape found in our
study to support the full S-curve hypothesis. The S-curve hypothesis captures both indus-
trialization and deindustrialization structural transitions during the economic development
process, as an extension of the Kuznets’ inverse U-curve.
Over the same time period (1960-2013), Japan and South Korea experienced a similar
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Figure 2.3: Value Added for Different Sectors among Countries
shape of S-curve during economic development (see Figure 2.2). However, Japan’s structural
transition pattern is more consistent with the U.S. As clearly shown in Figure 2.3, Japan
underwent industrialization earlier than South Korea. In addition, the ratio of value-added
of manufacturing to total GDP for Japan is higher than that of agriculture over the whole
sample period. For South Korea, the ratio of value-added of manufacturing to total GDP
exceeds that of agriculture only from the late 1970s. These reasonably explain the differences
in the level and slope of the S-curve between Japan and South Korea, while they both started
on the upward-sloping portion.15
As for China, in addition to the structural transitions between industries, the country
also went through enormous institutional transitions from a command economy to a market
system after 1978. Jain-Chandra et al. (2016) point out that differences between rural and
urban areas are the most important determinant of income inequality in China. According to
15As shown in the estimation results of baseline models, Japan is the only country that indicates the short
run effects of GDP per capita on the income inequality in a dynamic sense.
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Jian et al. (1996), income inequality started to decline in China since 1978 due to the spread
of light industries into rural areas and rapid growth in coastal regions. As a unique transition
economy, China adopted market-oriented reforms which substantially improved rural and/or
agricultural productivity and hence reduced income inequality from 1978. So the full S-
curve, which is closely associated with the stages of structural/sectoral transitions, may be
less applicable to China’s case. Therefore, to account for the development in association
with China’s endeavor of being a market economy, we see only the back portion of the
“downward” S-curve in explaining the GDP per capita-inequality relationship in China.
In terms of trade openness, we found a negative effect on income inequality for the U.S. in
both the baseline and country-specific models. A negative relationship is also found in Japan,
but only in the country-specific model. China, on the contrary, shows a positive relationship
between trade openness and income inequality, while South Korea produced no significant
effects. These results suggest a negative relationship between trade liberalization and income
inequality for developed countries such as the U.S., and Japan, whereas a positive relationship
for a developing country, e.g., China. Our findings are consistent with the evidence provided
in C¸elik and Basdas (2010) and Kiyota (2012) based on the analysis of imperfect market
competition and distinction between the global and local factor abundances.16
With regard to the inequality-GDP per capita relationship, it shows a positive causal
relationship for three out of four countries, indicating that increased income inequality spurs
economic growth. This implication applies to both the baseline and country-specific models
for the U.S., Japan, and China. In South Korea’s case, there is a negative relationship
captured by both the baseline and country-specific models, but the coefficient is statistically
significant only in the latter model. This implies that South Korea might have experienced
an inclusive growth phenomenon.
16The transmission mechanisms in explaining the effect of globalization on income distribution may differ
from country to country or from country group to country group. For example, according to Kiyota(2012),
China may be defined as a country with labor abundance in a global sense and capital abundance in a local
sense. For a developing country under this classification, trade openness could increase its income inequality,
which is also the result of China found in our study.
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Among the other determinants of the inequality-GDP per capita regression, the estima-
tion signs of the coefficients are all as expected in both baseline and country-specific models
with the exception of the coefficients on exports and government expenditures for South
Korea. In terms of exports, however, only Japan shows a significant positive effect on the
economy in the long run. This indicates that exports provided an impetus to economic
growth for Japan.
All four countries adopted some redistributive measures to reduce income inequality. In
testing for the effects of the fiscal policies, Japan is the only country where the government
redistribution policies had a significant effect in lowering income inequality. This can be
explained by confirming that Japan had larger variations in fiscal redistribution policies,
including direct taxes on individuals and social welfare expenditures, than did the other three
countries.17 However, in the Gini-GDP per capita relationship of country-specific models,
all countries except China showed a negative effect of fiscal redistribution. These results
imply that fiscal measures failed to reduce income inequality, and at the same time lessened
economic growth for the U.S., and South Korea. However, for Japan, fiscal redistributive
policies may have also hampered economic growth, but, at least, they successfully reduced
income inequality.
2.5.3.2 Discussions
Some observers and politicians argue that economic growth exacerbates inequality, and
that more attention should be paid to curbing inequality. Others argue for more pro-growth
policies while asserting that economic growth reduces inequality. However, the reality of
the relationship between economic growth and inequality is much more complicated than
these simple assertions. The various bidirectional relationships between economic growth
17Calculating the data from IMF (2016), we found that the standard deviations of the ratios of direct
taxes (on income, profits and capital gains of individuals) to total revenues are 0.024, 0.028, 0.025, and 0.009
for the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and China. Those of the ratios of redistributive expenditures (i.e., social
security benefits and social assistance benefits) to total expenditures are 0.022, 0.038, and 0.007 for the U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea, respectively. (Data are not available for China.) Among them, Japan seemed to
have the largest variations in both direct taxes and transfers over the data periods.
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and income inequality found in our study can be classified into four possible scenarios,
illustrated in Table 2.6. Case I indicates that if the signs of the bidirectional relationship
are both negative, it implies that economic growth lessens inequality, and lower inequality
further increases economic growth. This is called a “Virtuous cycle” with high growth and
low inequality throughout time. However, this virtuous cycle cannot be sustained if the sign
of either relationship is changed from negative to positive. Cases II and III show cases of
interchanging equilibrium outcomes when the bidirectional relationship involves one positive
and one negative effect. Finally, when both causal effects are positive we have the classic
“Trade-off” problem shown in Case IV. We can achieve higher growth only at the expense of
higher inequality. Where to put higher priority between growth and equality poses a great
challenge to policy-makers in this case.
As found in our study, for the economic growth-inequality relationship, all countries
experience the S-curve in the economic development process. This clearly indicates that each
individual country has the opportunity to experience both positive and negative causal links
from growth to inequality throughout the development process. However, for the inequality-
economic growth relationship, we found positive links for the U.S., Japan, and China, and
a negative effect for South Korea. As a result, only South Korea may have benefited from
the Virtuous cycle relationship with high growth and low inequality during some parts of
its development over our study period. However, as suggested in previous studies, if high
growth with low inequality is the main objective to pursue, various other complementary
measures such as education and government redistribution are definitely needed.(See, for
example, Ostry et al. (2014), OECD (2012))
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Previous literature on the relationship between income inequality and economic growth
has produced mixed results. Due to unreliable and insufficient data, varied methodologies,
different time periods covered and the complex mechanisms involved in the relationship, a
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Table 2.6: Four Possible Scenarios of the Relationships between Growth and Inequality
Four Possible Scenarios of the Relationships
between Economic Growth and Income Inequality
From Inequality to Growth (I to G)
Negative Positive
Negative
I: High growth with low inequality
II:High growth with low inequality
From and low growth with high inequality
Growth (Virtuous Cycle) (Interchanged)
to
Positive
III:High growth and high inequality IV:High growth with high inequality
Inequality and low growth with low inequality vs low growth with low inequality
(G to I) (Interchanged) (Trade-off)
consensus has not been reached. This paper contributes to the literature in the following
major ways. Firstly, based on the inequality-growth-redistribution nexus, we are one of few
researchers to apply the Engle-Granger two-step ECM approach to estimate the long-run
and short-run relationships between inequality and growth. Secondly, to allow for cross-
country heterogeneity, we construct (1) a baseline model with common determinants, and (2)
country-specific regressions with various combinations of variables for each country. Thirdly,
our estimation results demonstrate that the long-run relationship between inequality and
income levels tends to be statistically significant more often than their short-run dynamic
relationship. In general, the short-run dynamic relationships between economic growth and
change in inequality in either direction are mostly statistically insignificant.
We find that in the long run equilibrium, all four countries (the U.S., Japan, South Ko-
rea, and China) conform to the S-shaped curve hypothesis for the GDP per capita-inequality
relationship. However, the countries vary in their positions along the S-curve over the study
period. In addition, we show mixed results on the effect of trade openness on income inequal-
ity. Although fiscal redistributive measures reduce inequality in Japan, they play no major
roles in the other three countries. With regard to the inequality-GDP per capita relationship,
we find that increased inequality benefits the economy for the U.S. Japan, and China, and
hurts the economy for South Korea. All countries except for China show a negative effect of
fiscal redistribution on GDP per capita. However, for Japan, fiscal redistribution may have
hampered economic growth, but, it successfully reduced income inequality.
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Chapter 3
Does the Tax Cooling Measure on
Real Estate Really Work? An
Empirical Study on Taiwan
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3.1 Introduction
Real estate prices in Taiwan escalated between 2007-2014. The growth rate of real estate’s
prices1 during this period was around 39% and the price-to-income ratio2 increased from 5.76
in 2007 to 8.39 in 2014. These scenarios could lead Taiwan to a danger of real estate bubble
burst. It is believed that ignoring a real estate bubble burst can have disastrous consequences
(Crowe et al., 2013). For instance, a sharp decline in real estate prices may lead to real estate
market disorder and further trigger a financial crisis, while in terms of income distribution,
it may enlarge the gap between the rich and the poor. In order to prevent the economic
catastrophe caused by a bubble burst, the Taiwanese government adopted a tax-cooling
measure – a type of ad hoc transaction tax – from June 2011 in an attempt to curb real
estate price increases. The main purpose of this paper is to examine empirically whether or
not the tax-cooling measure is effective.
To limit excessive speculation on real estate and curb the rising prices of residential
property in Taiwan, the government imposed a special ad valorem tax – Specifically Selected
Goods and Services Tax (SSGST) – on short-term transactions of real estate within the
territory of Taiwan starting in June 2011.3 For real properties4 that have been held for a
period of no more than 2 years, the tax rate is 10%; for those that have been held for a period
of no more than 1 year, the tax rate is 15%. The ultimate goal is to dampen the upswing
phase and price increases of the overall real estate market through imposing a tax specifically
on the short-term speculative transactions of the real estate (tax-targeted market). Lo (2013)
showed the prices of the overall housing in Taiwan were still at high levels in 2012, which
1The prices of real estate are provided by Real Estate Information Platform, Ministry of Interior (MOI),
Taiwan. The prices are market or contract prices surveyed by the government.
2The index of price-to-income is defined as the ratio of average market housing price to the average per
capita (or household) income.
3This special ad valorem tax was abolished and replaced by a short run capital gains tax in 2016.
4The SSGST exempts “self-used” (i.e., owner-occupied) residential property and few qualified real estates
from tax liability. The conditions for the self-used residential property are as follows: the owner and owner’s
spouse and lineal relatives of minor age, own only one unit of a building and the land associated with the
unit, have completed household registration, and during the holding period neither provided it for business
use nor leased it.
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seems to indicate that the tax-cooling policy was not effective. However, it is expected that
the special transaction tax could only initially affect the short-run speculative transactions,
before gradually extending its price-taming effect to the overall real estate market. Therefore,
to investigate the effectiveness of the tax-cooling measure, the focus should be on its initial
impact first and the short-run transactions should be the targeted market of the study and
isolated from the overall market.
The contribution of this paper is to construct a two-tier regression discontinuity (RD)
model to examine the impacts of this speculation-curbing tax on the real estate market in
Taiwan. The two-tier model demonstrates not only the influence of imposing a tax on the
targeted market, but also the influence of imposing different tax rates within the targeted
market. According to the eligibility rules of tax implementation, the holding period of
houses in transaction is an appropriate rating variable. The cutoff point is at the 730th
day, which indicates that the transaction observations on the left side of the cutoff point
are treated with taxation while those on the other side are not. In the first tier, I run a
regression discontinuity equation at the cutoff point of the 730th day to examine the impact
of speculative transaction tax on the prices of short-term targeted housing transactions.
After that, I perform the second tier equation of RD within the targeted observations, which
delineates the cutoff point at the 365th day. The tax-suppressing effect on housing prices is
tested to determine if the difference of tax rates imposed actually matters. The result shows
that the special ad valorem tax was effective in curbing increasing real estate prices. However,
the difference of tax rates imposed among the short-run targeted housing transactions was
not statistically significant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related liter-
ature. Section 3 articulates the tax-price mechanism. Section 4 introduces the databases
and data sources used. Section 5 describes basic summary statistics. Section 6 lays out the
empirical models with regression discontinuity. Section 7 presents the estimation results.
Finally, Section 8 offers further discussions and concluding remarks.
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3.2 Literature Review
Among the extensive literature on real estate prices, some studies focus on the identification
of the bubble. A bubble may exist if the market price of real estate is much higher than its
fundamental value.5 Ahuja et al. (2010) found that in terms of the entire housing market,
housing market prices in China were not significantly higher than their fundamental value
in 2009. Hui et al. (2011) also tested whether a housing price bubble existed in the Hong
Kong housing market. By comparing market prices to the fundamental value of houses, they
concluded that there were two bubbles, one before 2003 and another after 2008. They went
on to suggest that the government can curb speculative activities by introducing a capital
gains tax on short-term transactions.
In fact, there are several ways for a government to regulate the real estate market. Crowe
et al. (2013) pointed out that monetary policy, fiscal tools, and macroprudential regulation
are all potential policy options to stabilize the real estate market. The effectiveness of a
policy is uncertain and varies across policy options. Theoretically, both Crowe et al. (2013)
and Allen and Carletti (2010) claimed that a cyclical transaction tax may be a better tool
with respect to stabilizing the real estate market. Empirically, some studies examined the
effectiveness of the specific policy. IMF (2010) studied the trends in real estate prices and
found the transaction tax performs well in terms of stabilizing the real market. In the case
of rebound economies, imposing a transaction tax could dampen real estate prices and limit
speculative activities. Hong Kong and China, for instance, imposed higher stamp duties
to stabilize their housing market, though the policy seemed to work only temporarily. In
the case of bust economies, the reduction of the transaction tax could stimulate the real
estate market; the suspension of stamp duty in the U.K. is an example. Aregger et al.
(2013) adopted various approaches to estimate the impact of a transaction tax and capital
gains tax on residential housing price in Switzerland from 1985 to 2009. The result from
5Generally speaking, the fundamental value of real estate is composed of the present value of cash flow
received over time and the terminal value of the real estate by the end of the holding period.
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the univariate analysis showed that cantons with increasing transaction tax experience lower
price growth than cantons with decreasing or identical transaction tax, although it is not
robust. Overall, unlike the results from IMF (2010), they found no sufficient evidence to
support that transaction taxes can dampen Swiss housing prices, and concluded that a
transaction tax may not be an appropriate tool to contain the housing price. Slemrod et al.
(2015) investigate the behavioral response to residential housing transfer taxes in Washington
D.C., specifically, whether or not a change in the notched tax rate causes a lock-in effect.
By employing difference-in-differences, they did not find enough evidence of a lock-in effect.
Until now, only Lo (2013) estimated the effect of the SSGST on the real estate market
in Taiwan. By using the vector error correction model, he found that the SSGST has a sig-
nificant effect on discouraging the speculative activities but showed no impact on stabilizing
real estate prices during the period from the second quarter in 1996 to the end of 2012.
While Lo (2013) used a macro time series, this study uses a micro panel dataset composed
of housing characteristics, registration and tax imposition. Therefore, I am able to apply
a hedonic decomposition of housing price in detail and to measure the importance of the
various characteristics.
In summary, the existing literature indicates that there is no consistent consensus on the
effectiveness of using transaction taxes to stabilize the real estate market. It is necessary
to consider, however, that the empirical methods employed may not well capture the effect
of the transaction tax. As Slemrod (1998) notes, the method used to isolate the impact of
tax changes separate from nontax factors is critical for accurately estimating the effect of
tax changes. This paper contributes to this end by using a two-tier regression discontinuity
model to provide relatively precise estimates. As a result, I am able to isolate the effect
of the tax from the effect of other nontax factors, and also differentiate the impacts on the
targeted real estate market between different tax rates imposed.
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3.3 Brief Articulation about the Tax-Price Mechanism
3.3.1 Household Renting-Buying Decision-Making Model
In theory, households will be indifferent between renting and owning a house, if the rent
paid equals the user cost of owning. This is not typical, however, due to the tax treatment
of owner-occupied housing by the government. For example, the imputed rents are seldom
taxed, even if the transaction and property taxes could be regarded as indirect ways of
taxation. In a tax system where imputed rents are not taxed directly, hypothetically the
rent would be equal to the user cost of owning the house as shown in Figure 3.1.6 The user
cost is formulated as the product of house price and the various cost items (as percentages
of house price) associated with owning a house, including mortgage interest rates, property
tax rates, maintenance, depreciation, risk premiums on residential property, and expected
capital gains, respectively. If real estate taxes increase, including the transaction tax, the
wedge between renting and the user cost of owning would increase, reducing house prices
for households. This may explain why some countries/areas (e.g. Hong Kong, China, and
Singapore) adopted special transaction taxes in response to housing price bubbles.
3.3.2 Theoretical Model of Real Estate Price Bubbles
There are various theories in the literature attempting to explain real estate price bubbles.
Allen and Carletti (2010) constructed a model, which focuses on the role of speculators in real
estate investment as illustrated in Figure 3.2.7 From their theoretical framework, real estate
prices are fundamentally driven by the expected flow of housing services in normal times.
In bubble times, it becomes worthwhile for speculators to enter the market if the expected
profits exceed the opportunity costs of the investment. In this case, the purchase price of
6See Crowe et al. (2013), p.309 for an identity equation of mathematical form.
7Allen and Carletti (2010) construct a two-period model to explain the role of speculators in real estate
investment.
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Rent paid = user cost of owning house (%) × House price
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Figure 3.1: A Wedge between the User Cost of Owning A House and Renting
housing will be greater than its fundamental value since the supply of real estate is relatively
fixed in the short run. To prevent real estate bubbles, the macroprudential tools involving
real estate taxes are typically implemented. The real estate transaction tax constitutes
one of the major cost components of speculators’ investments. Therefore, increasing the
real estate transaction tax mitigates speculation and related activities, thereby restraining
housing prices.
3.4 Databases and Data Sources
3.4.1 Databases
The data used comes from two sources provided by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) of Taiwan. The MOI began requiring registration of real estate
transactions in January 2012. Hence, there are no MOI data on transactions of real estate
prior to 2012. This dataset provides information on real estate transactions, including selling
prices, selling date and the housing characteristics (i.e., house square footage, location, age of
housing, number of rooms, number of bathrooms, number of parking spaces, number of living
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Figure 3.2: The Speculator’s Role in Real Estate Investment
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and dining rooms, type of building, building materials, etc.). However, due to 6-months of
propagation from January to June 2012, only July 2012 to October 2014 is covered in the
study. The number of observations is around 720,000. Data on the SSGST comes from
the MOF, this dataset provides information on real estate transactions that are actually
taxed. It includes tax rates (10% or 15%) imposed, prices of houses sold, and tax revenues
collected. Since the SSGST starts from July 2011, the dataset covers the period from July
2011 to October 2014. The number of observations is around 15,000. Both datasets include
land-only transactions and land with house transactions. Since the major concern is housing
prices, this study focuses on the latter. Excluding land-only transactions, the numbers of
observations in the MOI and in the MOF are around 508,000 and 8,000, respectively.
3.4.2 Data
The primary data used is from the MOI, which provides various detailed housing character-
istics for individual transaction. The data of property registration is merged with taxation
data by matching the registered identification number of houses sold to each other. The
final dataset covers July 2012 to October 2014.8 To conduct this analysis, I calculate the
holding period for each housing transaction before sale. In this merged panel data set, if
the properties were sold more than twice, then the previous selling date is identifiable and
the time of holding can be easily computed. For those that only transferred once but were
taxed, the “SSGST Tax Dataset” is then used to search for the previous selling dates. The
contents of data sources are organized as Figure 3.3. Housing transactions collected are
classified into two groups. The first group includes transactions of houses held for more than
two years, which are not targeted by the SSGST. The second group comprises transactions
of houses held for less than two years. These transactions are deemed as speculative and will
be taxed by the SSGST. Since the SSGST exempts “self-used” residential houses (limited
8I thank the MOI and the MOF for merging the two datasets for me by cyber coding. The most accurate
way to link the two data sets is to match the identification numbers of sales and buyers. However, due to
legal restrictions, the identification number is not provided.
45
Housing transactions
Houses held for
less than 2 years
Houses held for
more than 2 years
Transactions ex-
empted from the tax
Transactions
actually taxed
Few qualified
(e.g., inher-
ited) houses
“self-used” (owner-
occupied) houses
(limited to one unit)
Transactions
without tax
Not targeted
by the
tax policy
Figure 3.3: Data Breakdown
to one unit) and few other qualified (e.g., inherited) real properties from tax liability, not
all housing transactions within two years are taxed. The data on the housing transactions
actually taxed and housing transactions without tax, as shown in Figure 3.3, are the focus
of this study.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
3.5.1 Summary Statistics
Housing prices in Taiwan increased substantially from 2007 to 2014. As shown in Figure
3.4, the national average total price per house was NT$7,118 thousand in the 3rd quarter
of 2007, but climbed to NT$9,621 thousand in the 4th quarter of 2014. During the same
period, the national average unit price rose from NT$164 thousand to NT$242 thousand.
Due to varied degrees of regional economic development, houses located at different cities or
areas have experienced dissimilar price trends. Compared to the southern half of Taiwan,
the northern half, particularly around the Capital city of Taipei, always led the way when
housing prices started moving upwards. From Figure 3.5, the average total price per house
in Taipei was NT$14,837 thousand in the 3rd quarter of 2007. In the 4th quarter of 2014, it
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Figure 3.4: Average Housing Price Trend of Tai-
wan from 2007Q3 to 2014Q4
Figure 3.5: Average Housing Price Trend of
Taipei from 2007Q3 to 2014Q4
rose to NT$19,723 thousand, more than twice the national average. Figure 3.4 demonstrates
that the average housing price in Taiwan continued increasing, despite the implementation
of SSGST in the 3rd quarter of 2011.
The MOI dataset provides some characteristics of all houses that were sold during the
period analyzed. These characteristics are summarized for each house sold in Table 3.1.
The housing characteristics for all houses include location (collapsed into municipalities
and urban cities), age of houses, house square footage, number of buildings,9 number of
parking spaces, number of rooms, number of living and dining rooms, number of bathrooms,
building type, quality rank, story height, managed by housing security commission, use of
house, and house exterior. The types of buildings include apartments, independent houses,
shops, commercial buildings, residential housings, mansion buildings, suites, factory offices,
and farm houses. The quality of houses is classified into 5 rankings,10 with the first tier
comprising those of highest ranking. Houses are also classified as residential, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, residential and commercial mixed, residential and industrial mixed,
industrial and commercial mixed, public-shared parts, and public housing. Finally, house
exteriors include wood, steel, mixed concrete, reinforced concrete, stone, brick, prestressed
9Each individual transaction usually matches with a single building identify number registered in the
MOI dataset. Some transactions may include two or more building identify numbers in a deal.
10The quality rank is represented by the economic prosperity of the administrative jurisdiction of a city
in which the house is located.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics and Hedonic Regression Results
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Tax Dummy
House price (in log form) 508394 15.660 0.952
Tax Dummy -0.218***
Location:
Municipality (Special city with population over 1.25 million) 508394 0.777 0.416 0.631***
Urban cities 508394 0.913 0.282 0.384***
Age of house (in years) 508394 14.046 13.145 -0.014***
House square footage (square meter) 508394 255.193 4562.717 4.043e-06***
Number of buildings 508394 1.025 0.267 0.319***
Number of parking spaces 508394 0.441 0.834 0.219***
Number of rooms 508394 2.956 1.845 0.053***
Number of living and dining rooms 508394 1.630 0.830 0.134***
Number of bathrooms 508394 2.032 1.640 0.053***
Building type:
Apartments (less than 5 stories) 508394 0.124 0.329 1.118***
Independent houses 508394 0.255 0.436 1.465***
Shops 508394 0.019 0.137 1.995***
Commercial buildings 508394 0.010 0.101 1.541***
Residential buildings (more than 11 stories with elevators) 508394 0.371 0.483 1.050***
Mansion buildings (less than 10 stores with elevators) 508394 0.138 0.345 1.001***
Suites 508394 0.049 0.215 0.372***
Factories 508394 0.003 0.052 2.877***
Factory offices 508394 0.004 0.062 2.249***
Farm houses 508394 0.006 0.075 1.768***
Quality rank:
Rank 1 508394 0.167 0.373 0.192***
Rank 2 508394 0.154 0.361 0.192***
Rank 3 508394 0.089 0.285 0.155***
Rank 4 508394 0.079 0.269 0.147***
Rank 5 508394 0.063 0.242 0.199***
Story height 508394 9.628 6.890 0.018***
Organizations of house safety and management 508394 0.561 0.496 0.069***
Use of House:
Residential use 508394 0.646 0.478 -0.051***
Commercial use 508394 0.036 0.186 0.122***
Industrial use 508394 0.007 0.082 0.267***
Agricultural use 508394 0.006 0.078 0.370***
Residential and commercial mixed use 508394 0.046 0.210 0.071***
Residential and industrial mixed use 508394 0.001 0.028 0.351***
Industrial and commercial mixed use 508394 0.001 0.027 0.231***
Public-shared parts 508394 0.354 0.478 -0.056***
Public housing 508394 0.011 0.103 -0.211***
Exterior:
Building by woods 508394 0.001 0.033 -0.115***
Building by steels 508394 0.002 0.039 0.528***
Building by mixed concrete 508394 0.000 0.007 0.097
Building by reinforced concrete 508394 0.851 0.356 -0.163***
Building by stones 508394 0.000 0.006 -1.693***
Building by bricks 508394 0.004 0.061 -0.171***
Building by prestressed concrete 508394 0.000 0.010 -0.222**
Building by bricks structure 508394 0.065 0.246 -0.179***
Building by precast reinforced concrete 508394 0.000 0.005 0.400**
Building by steel concrete 508394 0.001 0.036 0.097***
Building by steel reinforced concrete 508394 0.014 0.116 0.198***
Building by mixed reinforced concrete and bricks structure 508394 0.018 0.131 -0.161***
Other covariates:
Local interest rate differences between 2011Q2 and 2011Q3 466625 0.111 0.078 1.724***
Volume percentage change in pre- and post- taxes for 508383 0.114 0.024 -1.860***
houses holding between 2 and 3 years
Volume percentage change in pre- and post-taxes for 508383 -0.734 0.086 -4.356***
houses holding less than 2 years
Volume percentage change in pre- and post-taxes for 507834 -0.099 0.730 -0.495***
land holding less than 2 years
Short term transactions (in lag form) 508393 1458.199 756.140 0.0001***
constant 9.522***
N 446170
r2 a 0.521
*, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
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concrete, brick structure, precast reinforced concrete, steel concrete, steel reinforced concrete,
and mixed reinforced concrete and brick structure.
3.5.2 Hedonic Decomposition of the Housing Prices
By using the merged panel dataset, I run a pooled regression equation to search for a hedonic
decomposition of the log of the sale price of houses in order to reveal the importance of the
various housing characteristics. Other than housing characteristics, there are many other
major local (dis)amenities such as school quality, crime rate, labor market, etc., which also
have a close relationship with the value of houses. However, it is well known that the
difficulties of these local unobserved (dis)amenities are a major problem in identifying the
hedonic function. Thus, I make use of this additional information obtained to examine short
run responses in housing value due to the important exogenous changes in local (dis)amenities
or other factors. In order to further examine the effects of changes involved with government
micro- or macro-prudential policies on the housing prices, I include five special variables: 1)
local interest rate differences between the 2nd quarter of 2011 and 3rd quarter of 2011,11 2)
volume percentage change in pre- and post- taxes for houses holding between 2 and 3 years,
3) volume percentage change in pre- and post- taxes for houses holding less than 2 years, 4)
volume percentage change in pre- and post- taxes for land holding less than 2 years and 5)
short term transactions of previous year, in the hedonic regression. The estimation results
are presented in column 4 of Table 3.1. These covariates are almost all suitably regressed
(except the variable called “building by mixed concrete”) and these control variables are also
included in my subsequent RD regression analysis. Interestingly, the pooled regression result
shows that the structural change from short run (less than 2 years) to long run transactions
and the tax dummy both have negative significant effects upon curbing the sale prices in the
housing market.
11The Central Bank of Taiwan adopted few so called “Credit-Controlled Measures” from the second quarter
of 2011. The loan interest rate and the limit on loan-value ratio were set differently among local districts
depending on their real estate market situations.
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3.6 Empirical Model with Regression Discontinuity
3.6.1 Internal Validity of Regression Discontinuity
3.6.1.1 Density Test of the Rating Variable
As mentioned above, the holding period of houses before they are sold is chosen as a rating
variable for this analysis. In addition, according to the eligibility rule of the SSGST tax
implementation, the cutoff points are set at the 730th day (24th month) and the 365th day
(12th month), respectively. The density test of the rating variable is conducted to determine
whether or not the cutoff point can be manipulated. If the cutoff point can be manipulated,
then the RD design fails. A valid RD design requires that there is no discontinuity observed
above or below the cutoff points. The tax rate changes according to the holding periods.
The tax rates are 15%, 10%, and none for the holding period of houses of less than 1 year,
between 1 and 2 years, and more than 2 years, respectively. A visual inspection can be
used on the graph of the density of the rating variable.12 From Figure 3.6, it appears that
the numbers of observations around both cutoff points are rather smooth in the curve. In
other words, there should be no discontinuity observed in the number of observations just
above or below the cutoff points for both holding periods of 12 months and 24 months.
The possible explanations for the lack of manipulation problems incurred around cutoff
points are as follows: 1) The real estate tax was the first of its kind and therefore it was
difficult to predict its actual burden in practice; 2) There are many real estate transactions
exempted from this tax. Such rules and regulations are determined by the tax authority
and are unknown in certainity in advance; 3) The exact sales date used for determinating
the holding period is the contract signing date, the date both sellers and buyers agree upon
the deeds, rather than the date registered in the government agency by the law, which is
relatively easy to manipulate. Consequently, this RD design passes the density test of the
12As usually suggested, I have run the McCrary test. By using default settings for the bin size and
bandwidth and assuming rating variable continuous, the results are rather confounding. For the cutoff point
at 730th day, the log difference in height is zero at significant level, but for the cutoff point at 365th day, it
is a bit vague.
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Figure 3.6: Density Test of the Rating Variable-House Holding Periods
rating variable. It is a valid RD design.
3.6.1.2 Probability of Receiving Treatment
In this section, the probability of receiving treatment as a function of the rating variable
is conducted to determine whether or not this RD design is sharp. The valid sharp RD
design requires that, taking holding periods as the rating variable, if a house holding period
is less than 12 months, the tax rate imposed on all observations is 15%. On the other
hand, if a house holding period is between 12 and 24 months, the tax rate imposed on all
observations is 10%. From Figure 3.7, where holding periods are less than 12 months, 98.8%
of observations receive the eligible treatment, a tax rate of 15%. On the other side of the
cutoff point of holding periods between 12 and 24 month, 99.3% of observations receive
the eligible treatment, a tax rate of 10%. Since there are high probabilities of receiving
treatments on both sides of the cutoff point – the 12th month – the design is clearly sharp in
nature.13 This similar test is also applied to examine the probability of observations which
will not receive any tax treatment, if the holding period is more than 24 months. From
Figure 3.7, on the left side of the cutoff point – the 24th month, 100% of observations receive
the eligible treatment, either a tax rate of 10% or 15%. On the right side of holding periods
13After careful examinations, the “no shows” and “crossovers” happened mostly due to the administrative
negligences or errors incurred in the registration of contract timing.
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Figure 3.7: Probability of Receiving Eligible Treatment
more than 24 months, 100% of observations are exempted from taxation. As a result, the
sharp type RD could be obviously visually judged and supported.
3.6.1.3 Examination of Non-outcome Variables
The examination of non-outcome variables is conducted to determine the potential covariates
used in the RD model. The criterion for judging and testing is that the discontinuity does
not happen graphically while I plot the non-outcome variables against the rating variable
at the cutoff point. No discontinuity around the cutoff point indicates that these potential
covariates could not be impacted by the treatment. As shown in Figure 3.8 and 3.9, all the
potential covariates are smooth at the cutoff points, the 730th day and the 365th day. For
the cutoff point at the 730th day, the non-outcome variables include building by mixed con-
crete, building by stones, building by precast reinforced concrete, building by steel concrete,
residential and industrial mixed use, industrial and commercial mixed use, house square
footage, and number of bathrooms. For the cutoff point at the 365th day, the non-outcome
variables include building by mixed concrete, building by stones, building by bricks, building
by precast reinforced concrete, building by steel concrete, industrial and commercial mixed
use, and house square footage. These control variables are employed in my subsequent RD
regression analysis, but, for simplicity, I do not report these coefficients in the table below.
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Figure 3.8: Examination of Non-outcome Variables at Cutoff 730th Day
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Figure 3.9: Examination of Non-outcome Variables at Cutoff 365th Day
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Figure 3.10: Multiple Cutoff Points
3.6.2 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Model
3.6.2.1 The Two Cutoff Points Description
According to the SSGST, for real properties that have been held for a period of less than 2
years, a 10% of tax rate will be imposed; for those that have been held for a period of no more
than 1 year, the tax rate will be raised to 15%. This makes a sharp distinction at the 730th
day of holding in choosing to impose the speculative transaction tax or not. Furthermore,
the 365th day point provides us with the chance to separate the possible treatment effects
from different tax rates. Since the probabilities of wrong treatment are slim at holding
periods of the 365th and the 730th day, a sharp RD model can be build to identify the effects
of the SSGST on the housing prices. Based on simple linear estimation, Figure 3.10 shows
that at the cutoff point of the 365th day, the housing price increases as the holding period
increases and the tax rate decreases. On the other hand, at the cutoff point of the 730th day,
the housing price with taxation (either 10% or 15%) decreases compared with housing price
without any taxation.14
14The housing prices are defined as the prices paid by the buyers in the housing market. I also tried to run
simple linear estimation on housing prices obtained by the sellers after tax. The results of the relationship
among housing prices, holding periods and tax changes are very similar to the one shown in Figure 3.10.
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3.6.2.2 The Estimation Equation
A sharp RD model with a rating variable of holding days is constructed. The whole estima-
tion is characterized by a two-tier procedure. As Figure 3.11 and 3.12 illustrate, two cutoff
points are chosen. The first cutoff point is at the 730th day of holding, which indicates the
eligibility rule on whether a housing transaction is taxed or not. The second cutoff one is at
the 365th day of holding, which demonstrates the change of tax rates from 15% to 10%. In
both tiers of operations, I start with simple linear regression and add higher-order polynomi-
als until 5th degree and interactions to it. After that, I take the covariates explained above
into consideration. Suppose x represents the holding days, z represents other covariates, and
f (x) is the polynomial function. The RD models for the cutoff point of the 730th day are:
log (price)i = β0 + αti + f (xi) + dzi + i (3.1)
where
t = 1, if xi ≤ 730
t = 0, if xi > 730;
For the cutoff point of the 365th day, the RD models are:
log (price)i = β0 + αti + f (xi) + dzi + i (3.2)
where
t = 1, if xi ≤ 365
t = 0, if xi > 365;
The key coefficient to be estimated is evidently α.
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Figure 3.11: Cutoff Point at the 730th Day Figure 3.12: Cutoff Point at the 365th Day
3.7 Estimation Results
For each cutoff point, a variety of functional forms are tested to determine which fits the
data set best. I tried first through fifth order polynomials, and allowed the polynomial to
differ on each side of the cutoff.
3.7.1 The First Tier: The Treatment Effect of Housing Transac-
tion Tax
As shown in Table 3.2, from the results of the estimations at the cutoff point of the 730th day,
the linear form of the model is the one better fitted and chosen, in terms of AIC and BIC tests.
For the model without covariates, the coefficient of t is -0.749 at 0.01 significant level; for the
model with covariates, the coefficient of t is -0.727 at 0.01 significant level. Approximately
speaking, the houses shortly held by sellers are sold 73-75% cheaper on average when the
SSGST is taken effect than when it is not. This indicates that the transaction tax adopted by
Taiwan imposed upon the short-term housing transactions does have a price-curbing effect
on houses held for less than 2 years before transaction. This is precisely the purpose and
reason for the speculation-restrained type of tax instrument adopted in Taiwan. From the
analysis, the government policy decision appears effective.
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Table 3.2: The Treatment Effect Estimated at the 730th Day
The Treatment Effect Estimated at the 730th Day
Treatment Standard
R-squared AIC BIC
Estimate Error
Treatment Effect
All data point
Full impact (no covariates)
Model1: linear -0.749*** 0.105 0.101 5729.270 5751.314
Model2: quadratic -0.570*** 0.169 0.102 5731.200 5764.266
Model3: cubic -0.673*** 0.233 0.103 5732.936 5771.513
Model4: quadruple -0.976*** 0.303 0.104 5732.464 5776.552
Model5: quintuple -0.932** 0.370 0.104 5732.436 5776.524
Full impact (with covariates)
Model1: linear -0.727*** 0.097 0.228 5458.226 5496.802
Model2: quadratic -0.550*** 0.156 0.229 5459.634 5509.233
Model3: cubic -0.628*** 0.220 0.229 5463.244 5523.865
Model4: quadruple -0.875*** 0.287 0.230 5463.312 5529.443
Model5: quintuple -0.926*** 0.346 0.230 5462.802 5528.934
1. Sample size:1828.
2. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
3.7.2 The Second Tier: The Treatment Effect of Housing Trans-
action Tax Between Differences in Tax Rates
According to Table 3.3, the simple linear form of the estimation model for the treatment
effect of transaction tax between the differences in tax rates also fits best in terms of AIC
and BIC tests. It indicates that although both types of houses are taxed, the change in tax
rates does not affect the house prices. For the model without covariates, the coefficient of
t is -0.092 but not statistically significant; for the model with covariates, the coefficient of
t is -0.078 and not statistically significant either. The design of the SSGST demonstrates
that the shorter the holding period before the sale, the higher the tax rate. According to
the results, if the tax rate rises from 10% to 15%, the prices of houses will be 8-9% lower on
average. This means that the higher the transaction tax rate is, the more the housing prices
are suppressed. There are, however, no obvious distinctions between them.
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Table 3.3: The Treatment Effect Estimated at the 365th Day
The Treatment Effect Estimated at the 365th Day
Treatment Standard
R-squared AIC BIC
Estimate Error
Treatment Effect
All data point
Full impact (no covariates)
Model1: linear -0.092 0.138 0.001 5061.082 5082.510
Model2: quadratic -0.082 0.215 0.001 5064.880 5097.021
Model3: cubic -0.051 0.290 0.001 5067.849 5110.704
Model4: quadruple -0.186 0.351 0.002 5067.126 5109.981
Model5: quintuple -0.183 0.408 0.002 5066.797 5109.653
Full impact (with covariates)
Model1: linear -0.078 0.130 0.099 4904.962 4942.460
Model2: quadratic -0.079 0.201 0.099 4908.398 4956.610
Model3: cubic -0.169 0.270 0.100 4910.583 4969.509
Model4: quadruple -0.188 0.325 0.101 4910.072 4968.998
Model5: quintuple -0.163 0.378 0.101 4910.052 4968.979
1. Sample size: 1567
2. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significant respectively.
3.8 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
There have been many studies discussing the policy impacts on reducing house price bubbles
expected from the imposition of transaction tax. The outcomes are varied due to data used,
tax system adopted, and even special historical or cultural factors. The SSGST designed
in Taiwan was intended to prevent the housing price from suddenly bursting by restricting
speculative activities in housing transactions. For administrative convenience, short term
transactions, which are defined as less than 2 years of holding period before sale, are identified
as the speculative activities. In addition, since the official price registration system for real
estate has only been established for no more than 4 years, this study could only focus upon
analyzing the effects of transaction tax on the short term housing transactions in Taiwan. As
more data is collected in the future, and as more complicated variables interact in housing
market, the tax-curbing effect upon housing price might be worth re-examining.
The means by which the SSGST would effectively curb housing prices is to reduce short
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Table 3.4: Volume Change Percentage of Housing Transactions Held for More Than 2 Years
Pre- and Post-Tax Imposition among Municipalities
Volume percentage Volume percentage Percentage
pre-tax imposition post-tax imposition change
Taipei City 34% 71% 37%
Taichung City 41% 73% 32%
Keelung City 49% 76% 27%
Tainan City 42% 74% 32%
Kaohsiung City 43% 73% 30%
New Taipei City 40% 71% 31%
Yilan County 42% 78% 36%
Taoyuan City 37% 72% 35%
Chiayi City 39% 68% 29%
Hsinchu County 46% 81% 35%
Miaoli County 41% 72% 31%
Nantou County 39% 64% 25%
Changhua County 41% 72% 31%
Hsinchu City 44% 76% 32%
Yunlin County 42% 89% 47%
Chiayi County 49% 73% 24%
Pingtung County 45% 74% 29%
Hualien County 40% 75% 35%
Taitung County 48% 80% 32%
Kinmen County 38% 61% 23%
Penghu County 38% 65% 27%
Average 42% 73% 31%
Source: Calculated from Lo(2013), Table 4.3.9, pp. 124.
term (less than 2 years) speculative activities in the real estate market. As shown in Table
3.4, among all localities in Taiwan, the volume percentages of housing transactions held more
than 2 years increased, in average, from 42% pre-tax imposition to 73% post-tax imposition
for the period of 2009-2013. This clearly indicates that after the SSGST, the speculative
motivations on housing investment were effectively restrained.
Real estate prices in Taiwan have increased substantially from 2007 to 2014. This price
bubble situation also occurred simultaneously around other new developed countries/areas,
especially in southern Asian countries/areas such as China, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Other than various macroprudential policies employed by these governments, all of them
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decided to adopt an additional transaction tax as an optional instrument. From this analysis,
it is evident that the special transaction tax on short term holding houses could slow down
the rising house prices. At least, such a policy is a good starting point for a government to
take action.
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Chapter 4
Price Premium or Price Discount for
Locally Produced Food Products? A
Meta-Analysis
*This chapter is co-authored with Professor PingSun Leung.
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4.1 Introduction
The local food movement has gained traction in recent years, particularly in the developed
world. This is reflected in the increased number of farmers’ markets. In the U.S., the
number of farmers’ markets increased by over 120% from 3,706 in 2004 to 8,284 in 2014
(USDA, 2014). Based on a survey administered by the Food Marketing Institute in 2011,
quality and supporting the local economy are the major reasons for buying locally-grown
food. While there is a strong desire expressed by consumers, agribusinesses, and government
leaders to increase the amount of local food produced and consumed in their localities, it
is unclear whether increased food localization is economically viable. Insufficient economic
information on production and consumption of local foods has hindered effective decision
making activities for individual producers and public agencies. The purpose of this study
is to address the consumption side of local food. Many studies have investigated if prices
of locally-produced food reflect consumers’ concerns about locally-produced food. However,
previous studies document inconsistent empirical results. That is, some studies find that
consumers would like to pay a premium if the food is locally-produced; on the other hand,
some find the opposite results (Xu et al., 2015a, Tang, 2014). Hence, the main purpose of
this paper is to systematically analyze the differences and causes of the mixed results among
these empirical studies.
Meta-analysis is a statistical methodology used in the field where the evidence of empirical
studies answering the same question is not consistent (Neves et al., 2012b). A meta-analysis
enables a more accurate assessment of the factors which lead to the range of estimation
across different studies (Cooper, 2009). Accordingly, to determine what factors influence the
price premium/discount of locally-produced food among diverse studies, we conduct a meta-
analysis of locally-produced food. We first generate a dataset of studies evaluating the price
premium/discount of local food in the literature. Relevant variables such as market structure
(e.g., local market share) and the normalized percentage of price premium/discount are
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carefully compiled. A regression model is then run with the percentage of premium/discount
as a function of market structure, and other factors including estimating techniques used in
studies, physical characteristics of product, and specific regional differences etc. It is worth
mentioning that we only include existing studies on fresh (non-processed) local food in this
meta-analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies exploring the conflicting outcomes
among local food studies in a quantitative and systematic approach. In addition, the exist-
ing studies are all single-region studies. Without employing a meta-analysis, it is difficult
to determine whether regional differences affect the empirical estimation. Thus, this paper
aims to fill this gap by pinning down the key determinants of the price of fresh, locally-
produced food in a meta-synthetic approach. We find that the data source, which is closely
associated with the methodology, is an important factor which explains the various out-
comes across studies. Studies with actual market prices generate a lower price premium of
locally-produced food than those with a willingness-to-pay value, implying that consumers
tend to overstate their value for locally-produced food in a hypothetical willingness-to-pay
situation. Furthermore, our results provide evidence that the trend in the price premium
reflects possible changes in attitudes toward locally-produced food. In other words, over
time, the price premium increases as consumers become more interested in locally-produced
food.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the background
of studies on local food price. Section 3 introduces the methodology and database. Section
4 describes the model and estimation methods. Section 5 presents the empirical results and
the last section concludes.
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4.2 Background
4.2.1 The Relationship between Meta-analysis and Existing Stud-
ies
Farmers’ markets are ubiquitous worldwide and affect their local welfare and economy.
Locally-produced food has generated more interest in the past two decades. Numerous
empirical studies investigate willingness-to-pay for different types of locally-produced food.
Generally speaking, existing empirical studies fall into two categories. One group focuses on
whether or not consumers are willing to pay higher prices for locally-produced food than for
imported foods. The other measures the magnitudes of price premium/discount of locally-
produced food. There are many different explanatory attributes used to determine the price
premium/discount of local food, including physical characteristics of product (freshness,
taste, organic, and nutrition) (Darby et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2012; Loureiro and Hine,
2002) and socio-demographics (income, education, gender, age, occupation, environment-
friendly, and family size) (Carpio and Isengildina-Massa, 2009; Darby et al., 2008; Gracia
et al., 2011; Loureiro and Hine, 2002; Martinez, 2015; Yue and Tong, 2009).
One of the common properties across existing studies is that only local foods grown
in a specific area are addressed. The advantage of this kind of study is that it mitigates
the noise of regional characteristics. At the same time, however, major impacts on results
due to the regional differences are neglected. A single study may only pinpoint the key
determinants of local food price for a specific region, but may not be applied to other areas
(Tang, 2014). Also, some critical factors, such as market structure, might be ignored in their
model specifications.
The existing empirical studies on the price premium/discount of locally-produced food
have provided conflicting results in terms of both signs and magnitudes. This controversy
could be due to different factors such as estimation methods, types of datasets (e.g., survey
data, actual price), regions/countries and specifications of the models adopted. To improve
on the deficiencies in the existing studies and explore the factors causing these conflicting
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Figure 4.1: The Link between Existing Studies and Meta-Analysis
results, we conduct a meta-analysis, combining the results from all existing studies. It not
only allows us to compare the differences among various studies, but also takes into account
the neglected determinants in the single study. The relationship between a meta-analysis
and the existing studies is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2.2 The Candidates for Attributes in the Meta-analysis
To search for attribute candidates which might explain the range of results in the existing
studies, we adopt a “5W1H” conceptual scaffold. The W’s represent Who, What, When,
Where, and Why, respectively, and the H stands for How as shown in Figure 4.2. We
elaborate on the attributes included in the study below.
Who: Who are the participants chosen in the empirical studies?
Respondent Type It is well known that the representative sample plays a critical
role in the results of research (Loureiro and Hine, 2002). Informed consumers, who are
actively engaged in purchasing or have experience purchasing the item, may assess the value
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of locally-grown food more rationally. They are willing to pay a higher price for locally-grown
food due to its quality and freshness instead of consumers’ intuitive perception. Including
the informed consumers allows us to identify whether or not different types of respondents
influence the results.
Consumer Nationality People from different countries might cultivate different con-
cepts and evaluations of locally-grown food and produce different results accordingly. Even
in a single-area study, consumers’ socio-demographic characteristics, such as income, edu-
cation, age and so on, have statistically significant impacts on their willingness-to-pay for
locally-grown food. Moreover, there exist large differences in culture, economics, and de-
mographic composition between countries. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that consumers
from different countries might assign different values to the same locally-grown food and
further lead to varied empirical results. This study takes the nationality of consumers as an
attribute to explain the diverse results.
What: What kinds of foods were included in the studies? Consumers’ percep-
tions may vary by the type of locally-grown foods and consequently produce different price
premiums/discounts. Based on our compiled dataset, there are five types of locally grown
foods investigated in the existing studies. They include vegetables and fruit, meat, seafood,
milk, and eggs. Chen (2015) analyzed the psychological determinants of willingness-to-pay
and found that attitudes have positive effects on willingness-to-pay in the case of local and
organic eggs and organic tomatoes, but show no effects in the cases of beef and milk. He
provided evidence that consumers value types of food differently. It is therefore appropriate
to take into account the type of food in explaining the diverse empirical results.
When: What is the time period of data covered? Intuitively, the social atmosphere
of supporting local food might affect people’s attitudes toward evaluating locally-grown food.
If an increasing number of people support locally-grown food, then there may be a higher
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willingness-to-pay for it. “Go for local” is a global-wide trend in recent time. The increasing
prevalence of farmers’ markets serve as evidence for the growing demand for local food.
Accordingly, the price premiums consumers are willing to pay may differ over time. Hence,
the time period of data covered could be one of the factors explaining conflicting empirical
results among studies. We expect that the price premium for locally-produced food rises
over time.
Where: Where is the location of production of local food? Regional differences
– culture, geographies, social bonding and so forth, associated with each region – may be
a contributing factor in the wide range of estimates. Furthermore, the characteristics of
agricultural and food products may be closely affiliated with their location of origin.1 Food
products with specific geographic indications may assure consumers of a more genuine and
higher quality food (Deselnicu et al., 2013). If a local food is also associated with specific
characteristics of the region of production, consumers are expected to be willing to pay
more for the local product. Hence, it is reasonable to factor in the production origin in the
meta-analysis.
Why: Why are other potential factors neglected in existing studies? Some
potential attributes which could explain the conflicting estimates of local food prices, might
be excluded in the existing studies due to limited scope of studies. Since previous empirical
studies usually focused on a specific area and food items, it would not be a surprise if they
neglected to include the market structure and product characteristics in their models. These
factors may be critical and would affect the price premium/discount of locally-grown food
among different regions. In this meta-analysis, we add three variables, namely market share,
government campaign, and product shelf life, into the modeling specification.
1Well-known examples of geographic indications are the wines of Bordeaux, the cheese of Parma, and so
forth.
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Market Share Ratio Food Marketing Institute launched a nationally representative
U.S. Grocery Shopper Trends Survey in 2011. This survey highlighted the top four reasons
which motivate people to buy locally-grown foods in the grocery store - “freshness,” “support
of local economy,” “taste,” and “knowing the source,” respectively. Pinchot (2014) also
surveyed consumers’ preferences and motivations for purchasing local food by different types
of buyers. Consumer groups included household consumers, institutional consumers, and
wholesale and retail customers. “Freshness and quality” and “support for local farms” are
the two important motivations for household and institutional consumers to buy local food.
While “support for local economy” is one of the significant factors which could affect price
of locally-grown food, this critical determinant has never been examined in the existing
literature.2
By using the market share ratio of local food, we investigate how the degree of support
for the local economy could affect the price premium of local food. People who are more
conscientious about supporting the local economy are expected to pay a higher premium for
local food. However, in spite of its close link with patriotic concerns, the market share of local
food may have a mixed effect on price premiums. On one hand, the larger the market share
of local food, the more the consumers would like to pay because of its larger contribution
to the local economy. On the other hand, it may also cause contradictory reactions for
consumers; people may think that there is no need to support the local economy because
local food already has an advantage relative to its imported counterpart.
From the supply side, local producers have higher market power if their market share is
larger. Producers may accordingly put pressure on the price for local food. On the other
hand, a large market share indicates that local producers may be weighed down by high
inventory costs. If local food cannot be exported, local producers may be forced to lower
their prices. In sum, it turns out that the impact of market share on price premiums is
2In the international trade literature, there are other studies, which address the home bias puzzle (Lopez
et al., 2006 and Hanson and Xiang, 2004). Strong consumers’ preference for local food over imported food
has acted as a natural barrier to food imports.
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unclear.
Local Food Campaign Government policies supporting local food purchases, such as
promotional advertising, might direct people’s attention toward local food. Once the social
atmosphere of concern for local food is formed, people may increase their interest in buying
local food and subsequently increase their willingness-to-pay for local food. Therefore, this
study expects that the price premium may increase if there are special local food campaigns
carried out by the local government.
Shelf life Many studies have indicated that freshness has an important impact on
consumers’ value of local food and further affects consumers’ purchasing decisions (see Low
et al., 2015, Brown, 2003 and Davidson et al., 2012). Usually, consumers may take shelf
life, the length of time during which a stored food remains suitable for consumption, as
an indicator of freshness when making purchasing decisions. Grebitus (2013) pointed out
that consumers may assign different values to different types of foods according to the shelf
life. Since willingness-to-pay reflects consumers’ value, different weights of shelf life across
different types of foods may lead to varying price premiums. We, therefore, employ shelf
life of local food to capture the degree to which the studies varied in evaluating the price
premiums for locally-grown food. Its impact on price premiums is uncertain. According to
Grebitus (2013), it is expected that the longer the shelf life, the higher the price premium.
In some cases, however, the highly perishable foods might be the ones with a higher price
premium for consumers.
How: How do the existing studies conduct their empirical experiments? It
is well known that different research methodologies, including econometric approaches and
data source, drive different results. We elaborate on them in detail below.
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Econometric Methods In our compiled dataset, estimation methods include the he-
donic method, conjoint analysis, contingent valuation, choice experiment, experimental auc-
tion, and questionnaire survey. The methods can be classified into hypothetical and non-
hypothetical experiments. According to Mart´ınez-Carrasco et al. (2015), the former does not
require a monetary commitment by the participant; while the latter does. For the estimation
methods included in our compiled dataset, contingent valuation is classified as a hypothetical
experiment, while an experimental auction is considered non-hypothetical. Conjoint analysis
and choice experiments could be either hypothetical or non-hypothetical experiments, while
the hedonic method is neither. Another type of classification involves revealed versus stated
preference methods. Among them, the hedonic method and experimental auction are meth-
ods eliciting revealed preferences; conjoint analysis, contingent valuation, choice experiment,
and questionnaire survey are methods eliciting stated preferences. Martinez et al. (2010)
stated that different methodologies may explain some part of inconsistent empirical results.
Hence, we take estimation methods as one of the attributes in conducting the meta-analysis.
Data Sources: Actual Price vs. WTP Based on our compiled dataset, there are
two types of data sources. The first is scanner data, which records prices that consumers
actually paid; the second is survey data, which indicates the willingness-to-pay value. It
is usually believed that the former is closer to consumers’ true value for the locally-grown
food. Park and Go´mez (2010) used the actual retail price data and found that the premiums
observed in their study were lower than those in the willingness-to-pay studies. This means
that participants may have overstated their price premiums for local food, illustrating that
data sources play a crucial role in explaining the estimated price premiums/discounts of
locally-grown food. Thus, by taking the data source as an attribute in meta-analysis, we can
rigorously examine whether or not consumers overvalue locally produced food when they
stated their willingness-to-pay.
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4.3 Methodology and Data Description
To identify the determinants of the locally-grown price premium/discount, this study
adopts a standard meta-regression analysis presented below:
Pi = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki + i, i = 1, 2, ....., N (4.1)
where Pi stands for the price premium/discount of locally-grown food in the observation
i, Xki are meta-independent variables, which indicate the attributes, and i is the residual
term.
To gather the observations for our study, we searched for relevant studies from databases
of EconLit, Agricola, EBSCO Business Source Primer, AgEcon Search, and Google Scholar.
To identify relevant studies we used the following keywords and keyword combinations: “local
food/produce prices,” “factors of local food/produce price,” “locally-grown food/produce,”
and “price of local food.” To ensure we included most if not all of the relevant studies, we
searched for cited papers within each study as well. The studies targeted were published
before the end of the year 2015.
The included studies reported the estimation results of the price premium/discount of
local food. However, they differed in scope (attributes considered and type of food) and
in econometric methodology. We excluded studies with processed and/or semi-processed
local produce (e.g., Onken et al., 2011, Hu et al., 2009, and Lefe`vre, 2014) to mitigate the
complexities inherent in locally-processed food. Since some studies provided more than one
observation, amongst the 26 empirical studies, there are a total of 49 observations.3 A
summary of the included studies is shown in Table 4.1.
Among the 26 empirical studies, some provided the percentage of premium/discount of
local food while some studies only computed the dollar value of price premium/discount of
local food. In order to obtain a consistent metric of price premium/discount of local food,
3Some studies estimated the price premium/discount for several locally-grown foods separately.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Locally Produced Food Valuation Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis
No. Authors Year
Food
Method
No. of Price Premium
Category Estimates /Discount
1 Adalja et al. 2015 Meat Conjoint 3 20.17%; 45.33%; 58.8%
2 Boys et al. 2014 Veg and Fruit Contingent 1 12%
3 Brown 2003 Veg and Fruit Questionnaire 1 1.50%
4 Carpio and Isengildina-Massa 2009 Veg and Fruit; Meat Contingent 2 27%; 23%
5 Costanigro et al. 2011 Veg and Fruit Field (in-store) Experiment 1 19.67%
6 Darby et al. 2008 Veg and Fruit Conjoint 2 22.27%; 39.29%
7 Davidson et al. 2012 Seafood Conjoint 2 43.7%; 39.2%
8 de Magistris and Gracia 2014 Veg and Fruit Real Choice 1 32.42%
9 Gracia 2014 Meat Real Choice 1 8.92%
10 Gracia et al. 2011 Meat Experimental Auction 2 20.45%; 11.19%
11 Gustafsson and Gustafsson 2014 Milk Questionnaire 1 15%
12 Keahiolalo 2013 Veg and Fruit Hedonic 1 -5.30%
13 Lim and Hu 2013 Meat Choice 1 44.38%
14 Loke et al. 2015 Milk Hedonic 2 17.35%; 17.35%
15 Lopez-Galan et al. 2013 Eggs Choice 1 77.00%
16 Loureiro and Hine 2002 Veg and Fruit Contingent 1 9.37%
17 Martinez 2015 Veg and Fruit Hedonic 2 -37.60%; -14.27%
18 Park and Go´mez 2012 Veg and Fruit; Milk Hedonic 4 16.2%; 8.7%; 20.8%; 0%
19 Roosen et al. 2012 Milk Choice 1 59.39%
20 Tang 2014 Veg and Fruit; Milk; Eggs Hedonic 7
0%;0%;58.7%;0%; 70.7%;
10.5%;46.9%
21 Thilmany et al. 2008 Veg and Fruit Contingent 1 3.50%
22 Ulupono 2011
Veg and Fruit;
Milk; Eggs
Questionnaire 4
52.3%; 113.42%;
57.83%; 62.42%
23 Xu et al. 2015 Veg and Fruit Hedonic 2 -9.52%; -11.93%
24 Xu et al. 2015 Veg and Fruit Hedonic 2 0%; 0%
25 Loke et al. 2016 Eggs Hedonic 2 33.76%; 39.74%
26 Yue and Tong 2009 Veg and Fruit Choice 1 35.73%
Note: 0% price premium reflects that the local price premium was not statistically significant different from zero in the original study.
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we employ the following formula to transform the price premium/discount in dollars to
percentages.
Premium or Discount(%) =
(
PL − PM
PM
)
× 100 (4.2)
where PL stands for the price of local food and PM stands for the price of imported food.
For studies employing an experimental approach where the price of imported food was not
given, we follow the method suggested by Deselnicu et al. (2013) and Lusk et al. (2005)
and use the median value of the price treatments in the design as the price of imported
food to calculate the percentage premium/discount for local food. The last column in Table
4.1 reports the percentage of premium/discount of local food for each studies. The price
premium/discount ranges from -37.6% and 113.42%.
Our final dataset consists of the following attributes, most of which are collected from
the 26 existing empirical studies. First, respondents targeted in the existing studies are
characterized as informed consumers or uninformed consumers. In our compiled dataset,
consumers who take part in the actual purchasing or have experience with purchasing the
product of interest are classified as informed consumers. Since the studies characterized
other consumers as randomly selected, for the purposes of this analysis, we treat them as
uninformed consumers. This is to make the distinction between informed and uninformed.4
Nationalities are composed of the U.S., Spain, Germany, and Sweden. We group consumers
into those from the U.S. and from Europe respectively to see if different nationalities lead
to different valuations of locally-produced food.
In terms of food varieties, various kinds of food are included - vegetables, fruit, beef,
lamb, seafood, milk and eggs. Due to the limited sample size, we categorize food varieties
into three groups (vegetables and fruit; meat and seafood; and others) in our meta-analysis.
The data periods covered in existing empirical studies are from 2000 to 2014.
4We acknowledge that randomly selected consumers may, however, include informed consumers and
uninformed consumers.
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The data for production origin, representing specific geographic indications of food prod-
ucts are not available. Hence, we decide to exclude the attribute of production origin from
our meta-analysis. As for the research methodology, different estimation methods have been
adopted in the studies, including the hedonic method, conjoint analysis, contingent valua-
tion, choice experiment, experiment auction, and questionnaires. Due to the small sample
size, we simply classify the estimation methods into two types: the hedonic method and the
remaining methods. By doing so, the contribution of the hedonic method to the difference
of price valuation of local food could be identified. It is noted that the data source, which is
represented by WTP and actual prices, is closely associated with the estimation methods.
In addition to the useful information provided above from the 26 existing empirical
studies, three variables – market share, campaign, and shelf life – for market structure
and product characteristics are created. Since official data for the market share of local
food is scarce to date, we need to compute the market share ratios of local food in each
individual study for our meta-analysis.5 However, due to the various definitions of local
food, identifying the proper scope of the local market for calculating the market share ratios
was rather difficult. To solve this problem, we contacted authors directly and requested that
they provide approximate figures on local food market share in their papers. If the authors
did not respond, we then contacted the USDA and other renowned experts on local food
to obtain more information. In total, we collected 38 observations for computing local food
market shares. Again, due to the limited sample size, we simply create a dummy variable
which indicates whether or not the market share of local food is over 50%.
For information on “local government campaign,” 43 observations are collected following
the same method described above. We create a dummy variable indicating if there is a
local government campaign during the studying period. As for the variable “shelf life,” by
referring to Boyer and McKinney (2013), we assign the days of shelf life across different
5To calculate market share of local food, the local food must be distinguished from the imported food in
data. As far as we know, only the state of Hawaii has the detailed statistics on local and imported food,
although it is available only up until 2008.
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kinds of foods included in each individual study. In sum, this compiled dataset provides a
wealth of information about local food for the meta-analysis. The descriptive statistics of
all variables are shown in Table 4.2.
4.4 Model and Estimation Methods
Based on the “5W1H” conceptual framework, after excluding production origin, there
are nine candidate attributes used in this meta-analysis. However, in our compiled dataset,
the variable indicating the data source, which is represented by actual prices and WTP,
completely coincides with the variable denoting the estimation method, which is represented
by hedonic analysis and non-hedonic approaches.6 Consequently, we exclude variables of
data sources from our regression. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.2, compared to 49
observations for other variables in the study, there are only 38 and 43 observations for market
share and government campaign, respectively. Due to this incompleteness, we purposely run
the estimation in two different model specifications. The basic model specification without
market share and government campaign is as follows:
Premiumi = β0 + β1(Informed Consumers) + β2(Nationality)
+ β3(V eg and Fruit) + β4(Meat) + β5(Data Y ear)
+ β6(Shelf Life) + β7(Hedonic) + i
(4.3)
Then, the extended model specification including these two market structure variables is
estimated:
Premiumi = β0 + β1(Informed Consumers) + β2(Nationality)
+ β3(V eg and Fruit) + β4(Meat) + β5(Data Y ear)
+ β6(Shelf Life) + β7(Hedonic)
+ β8(Market Share) + β9(Campaign) + i
(4.4)
6The correlation matrices are available upon request.
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Table 4.2: Description of Variables
Variable Definition Mean Min Max Obs
Premium Percentage price premium for local food.
0.248
-0.376 1.1342 49
(0.278 )
Informed
1 if the respondants are informed consumers; 0 if uninformed consumers
0.673
0 1 49
Consumers (0.474 )
Nationality 1 if the respondants are American; 0 otherwise (e.g., European)
0.816
0 1 49
(0.391 )
V eg.&Fruit 1 if the product are Veg. and Fruit; 0 otherwise
0.551
0 1 49
(0.503 )
Meat 1 if the product are Meat and Seafood; 0 otherwise
0.204
0 1 49
(0.407 )
Other Food 1 if the product are other than veg., fruit, meat and seafood; 0 otherwise
0.245
0 1 49
(0.434 )
Data Y ear Year of the data collected.
10.449
1 15 49
(2.777)
Market Share 1 if the local market share is over 50%; 0 if less than 50%
0.158
0 1 38
(0.370 )
Campaign 1 if there is local food campaign held by local government; 0 otherwise
0.814
0 1 43
(0.394 )
Shelf Life Days of shelf life for each product.
13.898
2 120 49
(19.580 )
Hedonic 1 if methodology is Hedonic; 0 otherwise
0.449
0 1 49
(0.503)
Actual Price 1 if the data from actual paid price; 0 if WTP
0.449
0 1 49
(0.503 )
1. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
2. For Data Y ear, 1 to 15 represents Year 2000 to Year 2014, respectively.
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In addition to the simple ordinary least squares equation (OLS), a weighted least squares
approach (WLS) is also employed in consideration of sample size differences.7 Generally
speaking, WLS indicates that the estimates generated from a larger sample size will have
a greater effect on the price premiums of local food than that from a smaller sample. The
residuals could be correlated across studies when some premium estimates are obtained
from the same study. Therefore, random effects models are also examined and estimated.
However, the results of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests showed that the hypothesis
that within-study variances equal zero cannot be rejected. This indicates that the ordinary
least squares is the appropriate estimation method.
4.5 Empirical Results
Estimation results are shown in Table 4.3 where the results of OLS and WLS for both basic
and extended models are reported. We find that consumer experience in buying food is not
a statistically significant attribute influencing the price premium of local food in all models.
Interestingly, U.S. consumers seem more inclined to pay a higher premium for local food
compared to European consumers, although the coefficient of the variable is not statistically
significant in the extended OLS model. The results suggest U.S. consumers are willing to
pay 21.7%, 22.4%, and 47.3% more in the basic OLS, basic WLS, and extended WLS models,
respectively.
The empirical results also suggest that the type of food might be an important con-
tributing factor to the price premium of local food. Although V eg.&Fruit has a negative
but statistically insignificant effect on the price premium in all four regressions, Meat is an
important variable except for in the extended OLS model. The coefficient on Meat indicates
that consumers are willing to pay a lower premium for locally-produced meat compared to
milk and eggs. The magnitudes are -19.8% and -22.7% in the basic OLS and WLS models,
respectively, and -28.5% in the extended WLS model. This finding is also consistent with
7Sample sizes in the 26 existing studies ranged from 38 to 10,469.
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results
Variable Basic OLS Basic WLS Ext OLS Ext WLS
Informed 0.051 0.010 -0.085 -0.166
Consumers (0.091) (0.090) (0.136) (0.122)
Nationality 0.217** 0.224** 0.234 0.473*
(0.099) (0.097) (0.277) (0.262)
V eg&Fruit -0.124 -0.130 -0.117 -0.122
(0.083) (0.081) (0.102) (0.098)
Meat -0.198* -0.227** -0.269 -0.285*
(0.109) (0.104) (0.172) (0.159)
Data Y ear 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016)
Shelf Life 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Hedonic -0.445*** -0.470*** -0.444*** -0.440***
(0.100) (0.093) (0.112) (0.102)
Market Share 0.014 0.073
(0.121) (0.118)
Campaign 0.038 0.063
(0.140) (0.145)
Constant -0.161 -0.225 -0.283 -0.594*
(0.198) (0.189) (0.347) (0.316)
N 49 49 38 38
r2 0.468 0.643 0.532 0.806
r2 a 0.378 0.582 0.381 0.744
rmse 0.220 0.197 0.233 0.152
1. *,**,*** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance respectively.
2. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
Chen’s (2015) argument. That is, people assign different values across different types of
foods.
The variable Date Y ear has a positive and statistically significant effect on price pre-
mium, although the magnitudes are rather small in all four models. This implies that, over
time, consumers have gradually become more willing to pay a higher premium for local food,
providing evidence that consumers are more concerned about local food nowadays. As for
the estimation method, the coefficients of Hedonic are negative and statistically significant
in all four regressions. It indicates that the hedonic approach generates a lower price pre-
mium than other methods. The estimated price premiums in hedonic models are about 45%
80
less than those in other models. Furthermore, the data sources of the hedonic methods are
either from scanner data or from actual retail shelf prices, while data sources of other meth-
ods mostly come from willingness-to-pay valuations. Hence, it could be interpreted that the
actual price paid by consumers is relatively lower than their expressed willingness-to-pay. In
other words, consumers seem to overstate their willingness to pay for local food.
The coefficient of Shelf Life in the extended WLS model is positive and statistically
significant. Although the coefficients of Market Share and Campaign are all positive but
not statistically significant, the positive effects of Market Share on price premium still
provide useful insights. It indicates that consumers have a strong incentive to support the
local economy. The more the local food sector represents local economic activities, the more
consumers are willing to pay the price premium for local food. Producers of local food with
larger market shares may also have strong market power and therefore set a higher price.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to differentiate these two factors from each other in the study.
Finally, the positive sign of local campaign is consistent with the prediction, implying that
the government may play an important role on this issue.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the existence and extent of the price premium/discount of local foods as well
as its underlying determinants can be of utmost concern to local producers, agribusinesses,
and policy makers alike. Although there are a number of studies that have examined the
price premiums of several locally-grown food products across different regions, the results
are far from conclusive with respect to the existence of price premiums and the levels of
the price differentials of locally-produced food products versus their imported counterparts.
This study aims to fill this gap by addressing an important question: what are the critical
determinants for the existence and level of local food price premium or discount? We attempt
to address this question by conducting a standard meta-analysis based on the empirical
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evidence of local food price premiums derived from a sample of 49 estimates obtained from 26
studies. Our findings show that U.S. consumers tend to pay a higher premium for local food
than their European counterparts. Studies using actual market prices generate a lower price
premium for locally-produced food than those with a willingness-to-pay value. This may
imply that consumers tend to overstate their value for locally-produced food in a hypothetical
willingness to pay situation. Among the types of local food, consumers’ attitudes toward
meat are significantly different from those toward milk and eggs. Furthermore, our results
reflect that, over time, consumers are increasingly interested in local food.
In summary, the outcomes of relevant studies should be interpreted with caution. For ex-
ample, some studies suggest that governments and producers in all countries should provide
consumers with more persuasive information about the attributes of local food, and investi-
gate whether the prices charged are consistent with consumers’ perceptual values. However,
production and marketing decisions based on this information may seem inappropriate be-
cause consumers’ willingness-to-pay values are typically overstated, as demonstrated by our
study. Additionally, the patriotic concern in support of local economies may be a critical
reason that households purchase local food. However, as indicated in Pinchot (2014), the
pertinence of the consumer patriotic bias toward local food may need further investigations.
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Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix for the Basic Model
obs=49 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Premium Informed Nationality Veg&Fruit Meat Data Shelf Hedonic Actual
Consumers Year Life Price
(1) 1.000
(2) -0.155 1.000
(3) -0.109 0.119 1.000
(4) -0.316 0.071 0.314 1.000
(5) 0.123 -0.295 -0.283 -0.561 1.000
(6) 0.291 0.304 -0.172 -0.375 0.120 1.000
(7) 0.047 0.187 -0.155 0.131 -0.311 -0.090 1.000
(8) -0.424 0.629 0.428 0.237 -0.457 0.241 0.026 1.000
(9) -0.424 0.629 0.428 0.237 -0.457 0.241 0.026 1.000 1.000
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix for the Extended Model
obs=38 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Premium Informed Nationality Veg&Fruit Meat Data Shelf Hedonic Actual Market Campaign
Consumers Year Life Price Share
(1) 1.000
(2) -0.167 1.000
(3) -0.162 0.078 1.000
(4) -0.327 0.099 0.051 1.000
(5) 0.186 -0.448 0.102 -0.536 1.000
(6) 0.316 0.476 -0.132 -0.379 0.120 1.000
(7) -0.007 0.193 -0.542 0.107 -0.273 -0.072 1.000
(8) -0.450 0.684 0.224 0.119 -0.411 0.352 -0.008 1.000
(9) -0.450 0.684 0.224 0.119 -0.411 0.352 -0.008 1.000 1.000
(10) 0.090 0.008 -0.221 0.054 0.010 0.266 -0.187 0.023 0.023 1.000
(11) -0.134 0.444 0.456 0.243 -0.485 0.103 -0.148 0.490 0.490 -0.130 1.000
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